


JPRS-TAC-93-004
9 March 1993



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ANGOLA

German Workers Seek Aid To Destroy Chemical Weapons

MB1502113893 Windhoek *THE NAMIBIAN in English*
10 Feb 93 pp 1-2

[By Graham Hopwood: "Chemical Weapons Find Raises Fears"]

[Text] Two workers with a German humanitarian agency clearing minefields in Angola claim to have uncovered stocks of highly dangerous chemical weapons.

Hendrik Ehlers and Uwe Silge of emergency aid organisation Cap Anumur are appealing for international help to arrange the controlled destruction of the weapons.

Ehlers and Silge told *THE NAMIBIAN* yesterday that they found the weapons after being asked by Angolan authorities to check ammunition dumps at Xangongo and Cahama in southern Angola late last year.

At an ammunition dump near Xangongo, consisting of weapons collected after the Angolan peace accords of 1991, the German aid workers said they found 18 phosgen grenades, designed to release a gas extremely harmful to the lungs. Weapons expert Silge said he is 90 percent certain that he also identified grenades containing a toxic substance known as "lost" which when released destroys human skin and tissue.

At Cahama the Germans said they found 60 SAM 5 missiles without warheads. Ehlers said the fuel of these missiles contains a toxic chemical which is a by-product of a highly toxic substance known as Sarin. Silge added that contact with just 800mg of the liquid is enough to kill a human.

According to the aid workers, these weapons are lying among other weapons in the ammo dumps and the Angolan authorities do not have the specialist knowledge to deal with them.

Ehlers said they were very worried that "other ammunition could explode in the dumps, that there could be a fire, or even after a length of time the weapons could leak" causing "a horrible catastrophe".

Both dumps are in populous areas and situated near the Kunene river which flows southwards to Namibia, supplying water to tens of thousands of people in southern Angola and northern Namibia. Yesterday NBC [Namibian Broadcasting Corporation] radio reported that the Department of Water Affairs is stepping up testing of water from the Caluque dam to ensure there is no contamination.

Both men appealed to the international community to provide experts to oversee the destruction of the weapons. As the weapons are at dumps where arms have been collected from both warring sides in Angola, Ehler said it is not clear whether the weapons originally belonged to Unita [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] or the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola].

"We don't want to blame anyone, but for the sake of the local population something has to be done," he said.

Silge said he feared there are "many more places" around Angola where these weapons are located and called for a UN survey of all possible chemical weapon sites in the country. The two sites at Xangongo and Cahama have not yet been the scene of renewed fighting between the MPLA and Unita, but Ehlers is worried that at the moment anyone could take the weapons and either deliberately or accidentally contaminate large areas.

According to Silge the phosgen and "lost" grenades are "easy" to produce and are believed to be manufactured in Libya and Iraq among other countries. They resemble chemical weapons first developed and used during World War I.

Cap Anumur is a German emergency aid organisation concentrating on medical projects. As a major cause of injury in countries where it has medical staff has been mine detonations, the agency also runs mine sweeping operations. The organisation has been working with the Angolan Government since July last year to clear mines.

JAPAN**Tokyo Plans International Weapons Ban Proposal**
OW2002095393 Tokyo KYODO in English 0918 GMT
20 Feb 93

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 20 KYODO—Japan will propose the formulation of an international framework for a ban on trade in both weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons at the Tokyo summit of advanced nations in July, government sources said Saturday.

The sources said Japan hopes the mechanism will replace the Paris-based trade regulatory body, the Coordinating Committee for Export to Communist Areas (Cocom).

The U.S.-initiated organization is designed to regulate the flow of only sensitive goods, such as high technology equipment, into socialist countries.

The collapse of the cold war structure has triggered regional conflicts, making it necessary to prevent proliferation of weapons for the maintenance of world peace, the sources said.

The framework, tentatively called the International Weapons Nonproliferation Organization, will be a multinational mechanism to control exports of weapons to countries involved, or likely to be involved, in regional conflicts, the sources said.

Japan hopes major weapons exporting countries such as Russia and China will join the proposed organization, they said.

The advanced nations have agreed to regulate exports of both categories of weapons and related materials to Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea.

The proposal will be put forward by Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa during the Tokyo summit in July, they said.

Details of the proposal will be worked out on the basis of recommendations to be made in mid-March by the Industrial Structure Council, an advisory panel at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the sources said.

Japan hopes the proposal will be incorporated in a joint statement to be issued at the end of the summit, they said.

HUNGARY

Parliament Ratifies Open Skies Agreement

LD2202181193 Budapest MTI in English
1743 GMT 22 Feb 93

[Text] Budapest, February 22 (MTI)—Parliament ratified an Open Skies agreement Monday [22 February]. Open Skies enables NATO and former Warsaw Pact members to monitor territory within a 150-km range and 10-km altitude ceiling and observe possible military preparations.

Canada worked with Hungary to create the joint system guidelines. The first test flights were conducted by Canada, Denmark and Russia over Hungary between 5 and 9 October 1992.

The international monitoring and supervision system was set up by 25 countries, including Hungary, last March to build military confidence.

Hungary and Romania conducted flights over each other's territories after concluding an Open Skies agreement in December.

INDIA

Official Statement Hails START II Treaty

93WC0023A Madras *THE HINDU* in English
14 Jan 93 p 6

[Article by K. K. Katyal: "India Hails START-II Treaty"]

[Text] New Delhi, Jan. 13: India has welcomed the START-II Treaty on reduction of strategic weapons between the U.S. and Russia, expressing the hope it would make a further contribution to promoting confidence and consolidating the climate of peace. The conclusion of negotiations in a short time, according to an official statement, demonstrated that "complex political issues could be resolved rapidly with necessary political will."

India utilised the occasion for reiterating the stand it had taken in recent bilateral discussions—with the U.S., for instance—on the need for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament issues involving not only the U.S. and Russia but all the five declared nuclear weapon States.

India had shifted its emphasis from the "global" to the "multilateral" approach, in the hope it would help deflect the Western pressure either to accede to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty [NPT] or accept the proposal for a five-power conference to work for a nuclear-free South Asia.

New Delhi's main objection to the Western proposals was that they showed inadequate awareness of India's security concerns and did not prescribe equality of obligations for India, and China, a major nuclear power, apart from other factors.

"START-II demonstrates," the statement said, "that it is possible to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race with a view to achieving nuclear disarmament. We hope that the START-II Treaty will be followed by the commencement of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament issues involving not only the U.S.A. and Russia but all five declared nuclear weapon states. Such a move would be facilitated if all nuclear weapon states could agree to a universal freeze on future development and deployment of nuclear weapons."

In today's age, according to India, there was a compelling need for nuclear weapon states to re-examine the doctrines of nuclear deterrence, used by them in the past to justify the expansion of their arsenals. "We would urge all states to commence negotiations for an agreement to prohibit the use or threat to use of nuclear weapons."

"A cooperative world order can only be based on non-proliferation and genuine disarmament arising out of a multilateral agreement aimed at the elimination of all nuclear weapons under international verification in a time-bound framework," it said.

Editorials Assess Effect of Start II**Pressure for Nonproliferation**

93WC0029A Madras *THE HINDU* in English
7 Jan 93 p 8

[Article: "Towards New Norms in Nuclear Security"]

[Text] The new treaty which the outgoing President of the United States, Mr. George Bush, and the Russian leader, Mr. Boris Yeltsin, signed in Moscow this week is a testament to the fast-changing strategic ethos in the realm of international politics. Styled as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (or START-II), this document might even herald the evolution of new strategic doctrines in the future. However, in the short run, what is more important is the solemn and studied commitment of both the U.S. and Russia (in its capacity as the old Soviet Union's successor-State) to reduce and restructure their nuclear arsenals. Now, as outlined in a background briefing, this task might be undertaken in a manner that would, in fact, "enhance security and stability on each side." In this sense, START-II marks no startling departure from the well-known principles of nuclear security. And, above all, the short answer to the question whether START-II would save the world from a possible nuclear holocaust is a clear 'no.'

All the same, the latest accord—a sequel to the earlier Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) which the U.S. and the old Soviet Union had signed—is a significant step. With diplomatic finesse and skill, the U.S. and Russia, in course of time, might even succeed in influencing the thinking of the other powers with nuclear weapons. For the present, though, START-II would, on a rough estimate, leave the U.S. with about 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads and Russia with about 3,000 by the year 2003 or a couple of years earlier. Overall, the START-II package deal is said to represent a scaling down of the nuclear stockpile of each of these two countries to one-third of its respective arsenal as of now.

Nevertheless, these scaled-down arsenals could still ensure "mutually assured destruction" (or MAD). As reportedly quantified by a former U.S. Defense Secretary, Mr. Robert McNamara, a mere 10 percent of the existing levels of nuclear stockpiles in the U.S. and Russia could serve as a MAD instrumentality. The START-II entitlements to nuclear weaponry would still keep both the U.S. and Russia in the exclusive club of military superpowers. Moreover, it seems that each side will "deploy a strategic arsenal based on its own calculations of its national requirements" but in tune with the "overall ranges established by the agreement." Viewed against these objective realities, START-II is not the short route to global nuclear disarmament.

On balance, though, START-II is a welcome development which has been facilitated by the fall of the Soviet Union and by Mr. Yeltsin's apparent anxiety to fashion a new "strategic partnership" with the U.S. in this unfolding post-cold war era. From an Indian perspective,

the main issues are clouded by a host of unanswered questions. First, mystery shrouds the real intentions of Ukraine and other former Soviet republics. Second, Mr. Yeltsin has yet to prove his political ability to pilot the ratification of START-II through the Russian parliament. And, above all, India needs to figure out the U.S.'s diplomatic agenda on nuclear non-proliferation in the specific context of a presumptive moral authority that START-II might confer on Washington. Delhi may now come under increasing pressure to either sign the patently discriminatory Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] or suggest new ideas to neutralise China's nuclear arsenal as an arguable factor of instability in India's neighbourhood. India's contention regarding the need for a global approach to nuclear disarmament calls for a creative new focus. In the domain of realpolitik, on the other hand, Delhi should assess the nature and scope of a U.S.-Russian "strategic partnership" and its relevance to India's security concerns.

Too Early for Predictions

52500007B Calcutta *THE STATESMAN* in English
6 Jan 93 p 8

[Article: "Arms and the World"]

[Text] On paper at least, the START-II Treaty, signed by Mr. George Bush and Mr. Boris Yeltsin in Moscow, signifies a giant step towards the objective of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. The details will interest the specialist in nuclear disarmament much more than the concerned layman, but the point needs to be made that the most significant aspect of the exercise is the virtual elimination of the temptation to launch a pre-emptive first-strike. However, if this is the main benefit of the treaty, which is a major gain on the first START Treaty negotiated with Mr. Gorbachev in July, 1991, the fact remains that Washington has now the advantage in terms of strategic, multiple-warhead missiles. After Moscow's gesture in agreeing to do away with all the SS-18s (described as "heavy" missiles which have no U.S. counterpart), the reduction in the number of strategic missiles leaves the Americans with a far larger number of sea-based delivery systems than the Russians.

In reality, however, it is still much too early to say whether START-II will make the world a safer place in which to live. Admittedly, the disarmament proposals have been scheduled to take effect over the next decade. The experience of START-I has been discouraging because, despite the 15-year life of the treaty, "renewable for successive five-year periods," nothing concrete has been done till now. Perhaps not much should have been expected, the difficulties being compounded by the fact that the Soviet Union itself has been caught up in the turmoil of disintegration, the break-up coming within 6 months of the signing of the treaty. Be that as it may, the fact remains that a special effort will have to be made to begin implementation of the Bush-Yeltsin treaty not just because of the START-I experience but also because President Yeltsin's position is not all that secure in

Russia. Further, since disarmament itself is a costly affair, the West, led by the USA, will have to provide adequate assistance, which could also be an incentive for States like the Ukraine and Kazakhstan to fall into line. These countries have in fact been quite forthright in saying that without such help, Sunday's accord could go the way of the Bush-Gorbachev agreement. The chance of a nuclear war being sparked off accidentally is greater in the fragmented post-Cold War world than when the Kremlin had a firm hand on the trigger.

Question of Implementation

52500007C Calcutta *THE TELEGRAPH* in English
7 Jan 93 p 8

[Article: "Non-Starter"]

[Text] No major nuclear disarmament agreement has been greeted with so small a bang as the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Like its forerunner the treaty accelerates the mutual assured destruction of the nuclear stockpiles of the United States and Russia. The prime victim for the wrecker's ball were first strike weapons like land based nuclear missiles that for so many years gave civilisation a 30 minute lease on life. Again the country providing the bulk of business for the scrapyard is Russia, largely because of Soviet dependence on silo based missiles. Another source of peril that will be eliminated under START-II will be the multiple, independently targeted warhead. On the face of it, no one can complain about a treaty that envisages destroying nearly two-thirds of the strategic arsenals of both nations.

However, the real question of disarmament today is not writing on parchment but rather implementation. Mr. Boris Yeltsin has such unstable influence with his parliament that doubts have been cast about the treaty's chances of ratification. While Mr. George Bush is intent on earning a boy scout badge for good deeds before he resigns, the U.S. is pressing for more radical disarmament accords because of fears regarding Russia's internal situation. Moscow's poverty has already put up a major obstacle to world disarmament. Russia simply lacks the money to pay for the expensive business of dismantling its missiles. Much of Russia's disarming is paid for by the U.S. treasury. In the years to come implementation will become the chief concern of the world's disarmament specialists. Another source of worry are the small nuclear arsenals held by the other former republics of the Soviet Union. Ukraine, for example, has infuriated Washington by moving slowly over surrendering its handful of atomic weapons. The central Asian nations are even more worrisome. Their governments are fragile and seem incapable of surviving the ethnic chaos and religious fundamentalism that exist within their borders. With the passing of superpower confrontation the days of nerve biting, arduously negotiated arms reduction treaties are over. Treaties are now easy to come by. Converting the clauses into ploughshares and making them applicable to other nations poses the contemporary challenge.

New Arms Race Possible

52500007D New Delhi PATRIOT in English
5 Jan 93 p 4

[Article: "START-II and India"]

[Text] Unless START-II signed in Moscow by Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin is endorsed by the three new nuclear weapons powers, created as a result of the break up of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan, it will not come into effect. Russia wants them to sign on the dotted line so that it remains the only nuclear weapons power, the successor of the former U.S.S.R. Kazakhstan has approved the new treaty and Byelorussia is prepared to do that. But Ukraine has not even ratified START-I which was signed when Mr. Gorbachev was the president. It is asking for \$1.5 billion in compensation for destroying its missiles. This, however, is not the only trouble which the new treaty is going to face. Another problem is that the U.S. president will have great difficulty in persuading the other nuclear weapons powers, Britain, France and China, to fall in line. They are not going to be affected by START-II which deals with inter-continental missiles. But START-I on short-range multiple nuclear war-head carrying missiles, does involve them. So far they have maintained that the arms reduction talks concern only the two nuclear super-powers, and China has taken the stand that the question of reduction of arms would arise only when it has reached the level of nuclear arms held by the other great powers. None of these three nuclear weapons powers has endorsed START-I, and unless the Americans and Russians are sure of compliance by these countries, they would not be in a position to go to their parliaments for ratification of the two treaties. In any case, even after the reductions envisaged at present, nearly one-third of the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russian would remain intact. The Americans are not thinking in terms of elimination of their nuclear weapons, despite the advantage they have acquired over Russia in the sense that they are entitled under START-II to retain their nuclear arms carried by their submarines and ships. Today the Russians are financially too weak to try to overcome this disadvantage, but once they have stabilised their economy and improved their financial position, there is no reason why they would not want to try again for achieving parity with the Americans. That could touch off a second nuclear arms race. It can be argued that since the cold war has ended, there is no compulsion for either of them to resume arms race. But Russians by and large resent the loss of parity: this should not be ignored. The Americans have other reasons for retaining their nuclear superiority. The NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] permits Russia to transfer nuclear technology and even equipment on a big scale to China, and President Yeltsin's visit to China has brought out that both he and the Chinese intend to take full advantage of what India regards as a basic lacuna in the NPT. The Americans also need their nuclear arms for the coercive diplomacy to which they have to resort in their effort to forge a new world order to promote their

interests and their beliefs and values. Under these circumstances it would be unfortunate if India gives up its nuclear option which serves as a deterrent to coercion. And how can India sign the NPT which permits China to become a great nuclear power by taking advantage of Russia's need for cash in hard currency?

Disarmament Discussed With French Delegation

BK2702082293 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English 0245 GMT 27 Feb 93

[Text] Official-level discussions were held in New Delhi yesterday between India and France on matters relating to disarmament. The two sides also considered international securities issue. The French team was led by senior foreign official, Mr. (Philippe Serbov) and the Indian side was led by Mr. H.K. Singh, joint secretary [in the External Affairs Ministry], west.

ISRAEL

Strategy for Disarming Middle East

93WC0015A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
15 Jan 93 p B2

[Article by General Ben; first paragraph is HA'ARETZ introduction] txt

[Text]

How To Demilitarize the Region

The Egyptians are no longer satisfied with calling for the dismantling of nuclear weapons—they also want to halt the race for high-tech armaments and the Israeli plan for development and launching of photography satellites.

The Israeli proposal for demilitarization of the Near East, presented the day before yesterday as part of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres's speech at the signing ceremony for the International Treaty for the Elimination of Chemical Weapons, was a landmark in the development of contacts towards arms control in the region. In the view of Dr. Shai Feldman of the Center for Strategic Studies in Tel Aviv, arms control has its place in Israeli defense policy and finds expression in the decisions the Rabin government has made.

In the 6 months that have passed since the change of administration in Jerusalem, the government has broken barriers it inherited from its predecessors, and decided to sign the Chemical Weapons Elimination Treaty unconditionally; to agree to EC participation in the multilateral talks on arms control; to carry on a direct dialogue with Egypt on this subject; and to announce an official Israeli policy on arms control, in the form of a statement of objectives presented by Peres.

Israel's opponent at the arms control talks is Egypt, which over the last few years has been conducting a stubborn diplomatic fight to clear the region of nuclear weapons. The Egyptians have not hidden the fact that

they intend first of all to have the atomic reactor at Dimona closed down. The Egyptian defense minister, Muhammad Sa'id Tantawi, said a month and a half ago that the nonconventional weapons in Israel's hands threaten the security of his country—along with Iranian fundamentalism.

Last week, a retired Egyptian general visited Israel, and appeared at the conference on arms control at Kibbutz Ginosar's Center for Strategic Studies. The general presented in detail the Egyptian position on arms control negotiations. The proposals from Cairo seem like a reverse image of the Israeli defense perception. Almost every paragraph was meant to neutralize another of the components of Israel's might, under the banner of "balance of power" among the states in the region.

The Egyptians presented a three-stage plan for regional arms control:

- Learning from the experience of the great powers, and of other states outside the Near East, and clarifying the positions of the sides in the region (as of now, the multilateral talks are mentioned at this stage).
- Public declaration by the sides of the steps they are ready to take in the arms control process (the sides committing themselves to present their statements of objectives before the next round of talks).
- Practical steps to limit arms build-up and cut down current stocks, according to an agreed order of priorities.

At the head of the Egyptian order of priorities stands dismantling of nuclear arms. "On this subject, our positions are completely at odds," the general says. "Israel insists on keeping her nuclear arsenal complete, and wants its continued existence written into any future agreement. The Egyptians and Arabs want to remove all nuclear arms from the region and to create a region free of weapons of mass destruction."

The general made it clear that any agreement that does not solve the nuclear question cannot provide a stable and lasting peace. The sides that do not have nuclear weapons will try to achieve a similar option, in order to reduce the threat. Elimination of the weapons of mass destruction will increase security and trust among the sides, and deepen the peace.

In his words, even after the removal of nuclear weapons from the Near East, Israel will still have a clear advantage over the Arabs. In her hands will remain the infrastructure and knowledge to construct the nuclear weapons anew at any time, and the Egyptians see this as a deterrent force in itself.

After nuclear weapons, the Egyptians want to halt the race for advanced technological armaments and their military applications in space. Israeli experts believe that this proposal is intended to curb the technological potential of the defense industry, which gives the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] an advantage over the weapons systems the Arabs possess. Egypt also opposes the Israeli plan for

developing and launching photography satellites into space, something that Israel sees as very important for strengthening the intelligence deterrent. "Israel worries greatly about surprise attacks, but nobody thinks of initiating such an offensive any more," the Egyptian general said, "Today, we are using the peace offensive President Sadat used in 1977."

Egypt proposes that the great conventional armies, which Israel sees as the main threat to her security, be reduced in the final stage of the process.

The Egyptian general says that the goal of the arms control process is "to achieve a higher level of national security for all the states, with the lowest possible level of armaments. In the Near East of the future, stability will be achieved through political and economic means, not by use of arms."

But, in his words, there is no point in talking about smaller armies before peace agreements and stability are achieved.

Effective reduction of armies depends, in his words, on four conditions:

- Balance in the size and quality of armies and defense industries
- Achievement of security through an agreed-upon political solution, without military supremacy
- Existence of an effective supervisory force
- Inclusion of all states in the region in the process, without distinction or discrimination

The basic principle in reduction of armaments is readiness of the sides to reveal their military capacity, especially in the realms of nuclear science, advanced technology, and satellites.

Israel strongly opposes the idea of balance of technical force, because its military superiority is meant to compensate for its overwhelming numerical inferiority compared to the Arab world. It also demands that arms control talks be linked to progress in the peace negotiations, and asserts that demilitarization will be possible only after peace is achieved. The Israelis agree with the Egyptians that all states of the region should be included in any future arrangement, if it is to be viable.

In the arms control talks, Israel's representatives suggested learning from the experience of the great powers, and beginning the process with first steps toward building trust and easing tensions, such as advance announcements of military exercises, direct contact between commanders, and jointly dealing with sea or air disasters. The Egyptian viewpoint is the opposite. The Arabs oppose any direct contact between the armies that might be interpreted as recognizing Israel's legitimacy before peace agreements are finalized.

"Israel puts the emphasis on technical aspects of building trust, which the Arabs are not ready for," said the general. "In Egypt, we do not separate the building of

trust and the control of arms. The two should exist concurrently, not separately."

During the latest round of arms control talks, held in Moscow in September, the Egyptian delegates suggested that Israel sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a treaty that Israel strongly opposes. "We already have a peace agreement and mutual trust," the Egyptians explained, "and the treaty would be suitable as an apparatus for extending this trust and security to the rest of the region."

The Egyptians say that the tools suitable for building trust are public declarations by the sides taking part in the talks concerning the steps they are ready to take in the arms control process, such as participation in international treaties and reduction in the size of armies, and on their order of priorities. Such declarations express the political will of the governments involved in the process, and in the Egyptian opinion, every practical step begins with a political decision.

This week Egypt played the stubborn role, which Israel usually plays. Cairo joined the Arab bloc in refusing to sign the Chemical Weapons Elimination Treaty, which Israel has accepted. The Arabs demand that Israel sign the nuclear treaty as a condition for their participation in the chemical treaty. On the eve of his leaving for Paris to sign the chemical treaty, Peres used the opportunity for a diplomatic exercise: he called the Egyptian foreign minister, 'Amr Musa, and read him the Israel demilitarization program.

The game of cat and mouse between Israel and Egypt can be expected to continue in the years to come, and even to worsen, before arrangements on arms control are reached. The next round of multilateral talks is planned to be held in Washington on 9 February. All the sides are waiting for Bill Clinton's administration to come into office. According to the new president's early statements, he will speed up the arms control talks and the efforts to prevent the spread of nonconventional weapons.

Missile Deterrence Doctrine, Military Alternatives

93WC0018A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
22 Jan 93 p B3

[Article by Aluf Ben]

[Text] Israel's reaction to the Iraqi missile attacks during the Gulf war concluded with warnings whose affects faded under the rain of Scuds. Israel failed to deter Iraq from launching ground-to-ground missiles at population centers. After Tel Aviv, Ramat Gan, and Haifa were hit, it did nothing.

At the end of the war, the defense establishment was condemned for bungling the buildup of military power. Central to the criticism was the claim that it was doubtful whether Israel had the proper means to strike back at Iraq even if it had wanted to do so. Top commanders feared the political price that Israel would

have had to pay for an escalation of hostilities that could have resulted from massive retaliation by the IDF [Israel Defense Forces].

Israel's theory of deterrence is based on the threat of devastating retaliation for any attack on the Israeli rear. Yitzhaq Rabin said during the Gulf war, "We told the Syrians that Damascus would be destroyed if they used ground-to-ground missiles on Tel Aviv. If they fired missiles at Haifa, neither Damascus nor Halab would continue to exist; both would be destroyed." The prime minister and the minister of defense still believe that in an Arab-Israeli war, without the complication of the Gulf war and the American coalition, Israel would need to make clear to the Arabs that any attack on its population centers would be answered with a reply 100 times as powerful on Arab cities.

From information published in Israel and abroad after the Gulf war, and from analysis of comments made by Israel's leaders during the war, it is clear that the IDF presented the political authorities two options for retaliating against Scud attacks:

Dispatching the Air Force [IAF] to strike missile launch sites or retaliate against sensitive targets in Iraq. Yitzhaq Shamir, who was prime minister, rejected proposals made by Avihu Bin-Nun, then commander of the Air Force, to send dozens of planes on such a mission. The Americans, who opposed Israeli action, warned against entangling Jordan and Saudi Arabia, through whose skies the Air Force would have had to fly en route to Iraq. Bin-Nun warned during the war that the Jordanian Air Force would "cease to exist" if it interfered with his planes.

Massive retaliation of another type. Such a drastic reaction would have been considered if Iraq had launched chemical warheads at Israel. The American secretary of defense, Richard Cheney, issued a warning during the war that the Israelis would reply with nonconventional weapons if they were attacked with chemicals. When asked about this, Moshe Arens, then Israel's minister of defense, replied, "Saddam Husayn has something to worry about."

Between the conventional option of dropping bombs from planes and the massive response of another sort, there simply were no other means. "For years, we invested billions of dollars in weapons systems but never developed an answer to Scud missiles," confessed a reserve general who for many years was one of the senior officers responsible for setting Israel's defense policy.

Critics have spoken of long-term neglect and contended that the army must provide the political authorities a range of possibilities for retaliation. It is inconceivable, they say, that an Arab state should escape paying a heavy price for an attack on Israel. In their opinion, the Gulf war revealed the limitations of relying on the Air Force as the long arm of the IDF. The use of planes entailed a risk that the pilots would be killed or captured and of possible confrontation with states on the way to Iraq.

The Air Force depends on precise, up-to-date intelligence about its targets and a complex system of command and control at a distance of hundreds of kilometers. Airplanes also have difficulty operating at night or in harsh weather. A Scud has no such limitations.

According to this approach, the right answer to Scuds is a weapon just like it: an inexpensive, conventional ground-to-ground missile that can be produced in large numbers—"1,000 little missiles." Defense experts believe that launching such a "terrorist missile" at the capital of Iraq in retaliation for a Scud attack on Tel Aviv would not have resulted in escalation. The political risk involved in using a little missile is far smaller than that of a flight of dozens of attack aircraft over the skies of Baghdad. If the missile is accurate, unlike the Scud and its Iraqi-made progeny, it can threaten sensitive point targets in enemy territory. Israelis remember the bombardment of the Syrian general staff in Damascus during the Yom Kippur War.

The chief critic of the doctrine of reliance on the Air Force and of its shortcomings during the Gulf War is the deputy minister of defense, Gen. (Res.) Yisra'el Tal.

The criticism leveled by Tal and his colleagues has not been wholly accepted in the defense establishment; it arouses resistance from those who believe in the capability of the Air Force and argue that no need exists for any other reply to missile attacks from remote countries. They regard any investment in developing such responses as a waste of money. "If the object is to punish or deter, the Air Force is capable of that mission, as was proved by the strike on Iraq's nuclear reactor," says one, a prominent member of this circle. "We had no reason to think that the Air Force was unable to serve as our long arm."

Air Force proponents say that the air plane is a multi-purpose instrument. It can reach Baghdad, but it will be used in most instances for more important assignments to tip the scales on the battlefield. The "terrorist missile," if the IDF had it, is good for a single target, and there is no assurance that Israel will be subject in the next conflict to the threats it faced in the Gulf War.

In the years before the Gulf war, Israel did not prepare itself to absorb missile attacks from over the horizon. The chief object of war according to defense theory was to defeat the enemy. The strategy was to take the war to the enemy's territory and present such a threat to his vital installations that he would sue for a cease-fire.

This doctrine was suitable for wars against neighboring states. Israel, however, is unable to defeat Iraq, Libya or Iran, which are much farther away. Military history teaches also that it is difficult to deter a distant enemy by conventional means. Rabin can threaten to destroy Syria's cities because they are vulnerable to attack from a distance of a few minutes flying time from central Israel. But the Air Force would face difficulties in exacting a similar price from the Iraqis and maintaining an aggressive presence over its cities for more than a

short time. It also is still an open question whether an attack on the enemy's rear acts as a deterrent. Baghdad absorbed many more bombs and missiles during the Gulf war than Tel Aviv, yet the number of Scuds launched did not decrease.

The defense system debated during the 1980s whether to update its defense doctrine, which David Ben-Gurion had fixed during the first years of the state. And if the IDF's multiyear plan of 1986 still did not deal with threats originating from countries farther away than Israel's neighbors, the multiyear plan adopted in 1988 did take into account the threat of missiles launched from periphery states such as Iraq and Libya.

Opponents of the changes in the defense doctrine contend that Israel has no choice but to get used to the existence of a "homefront" and to learn to live with Scuds, at least until the development of effective devices for intercepting them. In their opinion, the Scud is unable to determine the outcome of war; thus, Israel must not be drawn into a contest over terror in its population centers, which would divert its attention from the need to win the war at the front.

Supporters of the policy of "missile against missile" argue that there is no moral drawback in using ground-to-ground missiles for retaliation. In recent years, however, an international norm, based on moral considerations, has evolved against the use of long-range missiles, which it lumps together with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The Israeli Government's arms control initiative, proposed by Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres, primarily seeks the removal of missile weapons in the Middle East. Israel is also a signatory to the international arms inspection treaty, which is designed to prevent the proliferation of missile technology.

Ground-to-ground missiles entered the Middle Eastern arena during the Yom Kippur war. The Syrians fired Frog missiles at the Air Force base at Ramat David, striking towns such as Givat and Migdal Ha'emek in the Jezreel Valley. In retaliation, the Air Force struck targets deep in Syria and Damascus. The Egyptians launched Scud missiles during the Yom Kippur War, aiming for IDF forces in the Sinai and west of the Suez Canal.

In 1975, the United States sent Israel a battery of Lance missiles, which had an operational range of 75 km and carried a conventional warhead. The Lance was incorporated into the artillery corps but was never used and eventually became obsolete. The next stage was delivery of Pershing missiles, with a range up to 750 km, which were promised Israel after the Sinai interim agreements of 1975. The Carter administration, however, froze the deal and it was never fulfilled.

Israel has never admitted possessing long-range missiles. According to foreign reports, Israel has been involved since the early 1960s in developing ground-to-ground missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, which the reports dubbed the "Jericho." Development began in

cooperation with the French company Desau and continued in Israel after the Six Day War. American documents seized in Iran revealed that former Defense Minister 'Ezer Weizmann stated that the missile went into service in 1970.

According to foreign accounts, Iran signed an agreement in 1977 for joint production of a missile with a range of 500 km and a conventional warhead weighing 750 kg. The deal fell apart after the fall of the shah's regime in 1979. In the 1980s, the foreign media reported that Israel was jointly developing nuclear-armed missiles with South Africa and had jointly tested a missile with a range of 1,400 km in 1989. Late in 1991, Israel pledged to stop exporting missile technology. Richard Clark, then U.S. assistant secretary of state, asserted that he had compelled Israel to sever its ties to South Africa and cancel their joint projects.

Foreign reports further state that two models were developed, one with a range of 500 km and the other with a range of 800 to 1,500 km (the reports vary). During the Gulf war, the Israeli press published a map of the Middle East showing estimated ranges of Iraqi and Israeli missiles. The Israeli missile mentioned in foreign reports looked more menacing on the map but remained in its silo while Iraqi missiles sowed destruction in Israel's cities.

Successful Arrow Missile Intercept Test Conducted

*TA2802184893 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in English
1800 GMT 28 Feb 93*

[Excerpts] Israel's experimental antiballistic missile, the Arrow, this afternoon made its first test launch against another missile. Sources close to the program say the Arrow successfully intercepted the incoming missile. Reporter Alan Ben-'Ami has more details:

The launch was watched anxiously by Israeli and U.S. scientists connected to the program. Development of the Arrow is being done here in Israel, but funded largely by the United States as part of the SDI, or Star Wars program. There have been four previous Arrow launches since the program began in July 1989 to test the launching, control, and avionic systems. Not all have been entirely successful, and scientists at Israel Aircraft Industries have worked hard to overcome the snags.

The launching of an Arrow against an incoming missile marks the beginning of a new stage in the antimissile development program, and sources close to the program say the test was a successful one. The Arrow was launched against another Arrow missile, which had been fired seconds earlier. Both missiles were launched from a naval platform off the Israeli coast. Within two minutes the missiles were separately launched, the intercept took place, and the test successfully concluded. The intercept Arrow successfully detected and locked onto its target, passing it within meters as intended, I was told. The aim

of this flight was apparently to test the Arrow's interception accuracy, rather than its destructive capability. But it is pointed out that the Arrow came close enough to have destroyed its target had that been the plan. [passage omitted]

At least three other intercept launches are planned to take place this year, and if all goes well the next stage of the program will involve seven test flights of a smaller Arrow, but one which will have twice the capability in height and range of the current model. The United States covered 80 percent of the \$128 million cost of the initial developing stage of the Arrow, and is now funding 72 percent of the \$321 million budgeted for the current stages of the Arrow's development.

Arrow Radar System Information To Be Withheld From SDIO

*TA0303145493 Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew
3 Mar 93 p 9*

[By Sharon Sade]

[Text] Israel will not relay information pertaining to the development of the Arrow's fire-control radar to the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization [SDIO], which finances the missile development project. A senior defense establishment figure has said that as the financial backers the United States is given all the information pertaining to the missile itself but that the development of the radar system, which is supposed to detect hostile missiles and to guide Arrow missiles to them, is fully financed by the Defense Ministry. Therefore, no technical information about it will be given away.

The Defense Ministry allocation for the radar project stands at approximately \$100 million. The project is due to be concluded within 3 years, and the estimated price of a radar unit is to be about \$20 to 30 million.

The radar, dubbed the "Music Radar," is based on the Falcon, the Israel Aircraft Industries' [IAI] detection radar system.

The United States has announced in official publications that at this point, it does not plan on purchasing Arrow missiles. As for the radar development, it has been reported that the United States is developing a different kind of radar, based on shorter wavelengths than those of the Arrow's radar, and therefore do not need the Israeli development. The U.S. radars, which cost ten times more than those of the Arrow, are more suitable for the antimissile missile systems currently developed in the United States because these missiles require more precise guidance to their targets.

Simultaneous with the missile development, the IAI's Systems Engineering and Components plant, in which the Arrow project is carried out, is completing the

development of a missile-launching vehicle. The Arrow battery is supposed to be mobile, and each launching position will be composed of a cluster of six missiles, which will be moved from place to place aboard a towing truck.

The present Arrow missile is about 7 meters long and weighs some 3.5 tonnes, but in its final two-phase version, which will be completed by the end of the year, the Arrow is supposed to shrink to a length of 5 meters and a weight of about 2 tonnes.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

Ukrainian Discussion of START I Ratification

Value of Security Guaranty Doubted

934K0190A Kiev NARODNA HAZETA in Ukrainian
No 4, Jan 93 pp 4-5

[Article by Oleksiy Redchenko: "I'm Your Wing, You're My Wing, and We Couldn't Be Happier..."]

[Text] *What is troubling is not so much the possibility that the Supreme Council of Ukraine might hastily ratify the START I agreement and the Lisbon protocol... What is disturbing is the emphasis on foreign factors in ensuring the security of the Ukrainian state that is becoming increasingly more pronounced in the President's policy. Is this not a symptom of that chronic national disease that V. Lypynskyy described—to look always for a defender on the outside? In the past, we have relied on Warsaw, on Moscow, on the sultan... Now it's on Washington... At a press conference last week, Leonid Kravchuk aptly described those who insist on signing the CIS charter: "These forces are once again dragging Ukraine under a foreign wing, a wing under which she has already suffered unprecedented repressions, a terrible famine, and the destruction of her culture and language..." Very true. But the President is doing the very same thing in the sphere of nuclear policy—he is dragging Ukraine under the nuclear "wing" of this same Russia and, as additional insurance, also counting on a second "wing"—that of the United States. Is it justified to regard this as the best policy? It is unfortunate, but in this respect Ukraine reminds one of a small child diligently learning to behave as two "big uncles" want it to behave...*

In an exchange last year with Mr. Yevhen Shtendera, the editor in chief of LITOPYS UPA, who lives in the United States, I asked why the West had reacted in such extreme fashion to Ukraine's having temporarily suspended the removal of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia? Are they afraid of us?... My interlocutor answered that the West does not like the change in our position, because this is a sign of unpredictability in the country's policy. The West likes stability...

In other words, the West values peace. Thus what Ukraine is now doing on its way to unilateral nuclear disarmament is not so much for the sake of the peace of Ukrainians as it is for the sake of the peace of a sated West, whose general public never expected the birth in Europe at the end of the 20th Century of a state as large in territory as France and, consequently, additional worries and trouble for the West as a result of the "unpredictability" of this state's policies.

Many in Ukraine now recognize the obvious errancy of the position on our "non-nuclear status," whose amorphous and unspecific nature in the Declaration on State Sovereignty gave many interested countries grounds to expect us to disarm unilaterally with lightning speed. Let us admit that we, who are not very experienced in world

politics, have been nicely "caught": having said "a," we now have to say "b," and so on. To resist, but to do it anyway. Even though we should have said honestly long ago that we made a mistake and that we can dismantle the last Ukrainian nuclear-armed missile only when all countries—without exception!—that are officially recognized as nuclear powers do the same.

In light of the capers of Russia's Supreme Soviet with respect to the Crimea and Sevastopol, the events of last year, as well as those of this year, offer us serious moral grounds on which to correct this mistake and proclaim *Ukraine's temporary nuclear status until it obtains genuine security guarantees*. In the first place, this formulation would allow us independently, without the Americans or Russians and without handing over our missiles, to define what we mean by "genuine guarantees" and thus enable us to effectively influence events as the affect Ukraine, and, second, this step would be understandable at least to that segment of Western politicians, who comprehend the nature of the Russian monster's aggressiveness and know the ways to curb it.

However, our President continually talks about the necessity of "ridding ourselves of the nuclear burden," which is very reminiscent of the position of the "peace-loving" leaders of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR), as exemplified by V. Vynnychenko, who on the eve of Muravyov's Muscovite march on Kharkiv and Kiev pathetically proclaimed: "It is not an army of our own that we need, but the destruction of all standing armies!"...

"We must give our parliament serious arguments so that it will ratify the START I agreement," said President Kravchuk at the press conference. "The first argument is a guarantee of our security by Russia and the United States, who are parties to START I. The second is based on the amount of compensation paid for the nuclear fuel in the warheads and the promised aid to destroy the nuclear weapons. The third argument involves the practical means for destroying these arms... I expect that after hearing these arguments, the Supreme Council will not refuse to ratify the agreement."

The key issue in this list is, of course, the question of guarantees.

"Guarantees"...Just what are they? "This entails a wide range of issues," responds the President, "especially those pertaining to the inviolability of our borders, our territorial integrity, appropriate actions taken by the guarantor—through the UN or the Security Council—in the event of an attack on Ukraine..."

Might it not be fitting to recall the lessons of Munich 1938, when the states that were to have defended Czechoslovakia left it in the lurch? Is this not a classic example of a situation when in a critical international situation the interests of the weaker party are sacrificed to the interests of the powerful?

You will say that the world has changed. In that case, how are we to interpret the present double diplomacy of the United States (our probable guarantor)? The United States is strictly implementing UN resolutions with respect to Iraq, but when it is a matter of Israel removing its forces from the occupied Arab territories in accordance with the resolutions of this same United Nations, the United States confines itself to ambiguous statements. Thus, the world has not changed in the most important respects—the interests of the powerful come first. And the level of U.S. respect for those resolutions is directly dependent on its own interests. Let us also not forget that there are innumerable ways of walking away from any obligations assumed towards us.

For example, the West may, at the request of Russia, link the implementation of our security guarantees to Ukraine's observance of "human rights"—first and foremost, those of the so-called "Russian-speaking population," whose rights, and especially its preeminent "right"—to block the rebirth of the Ukrainian nation on its own ethnic territory—Moscow will zealously defend from the UN rostrum...

The United States will not quarrel seriously with Moscow if it should again swallow up our land—the powerful have plenty of common interests. After all, the United States already had an opportunity to give a practical demonstration of its devotion to the "ideals of democracy," when it recognized the fascist regime of the USSR in 1933, though it was well aware of what was happening in the western part of the Muscovite empire and knew the source of the cheap bread that had appeared in Europe.

Thus, while paying tribute to the perfection and democratism of the 200-year-old state institutions of the United States, let us not forget that in international affairs, "American-style" democracy will not necessarily coincide with the national interests of Ukrainians...

A redistribution of spheres of influence is currently taking place between the United States and Russia, which is not to the latter's advantage. And Kozyrev's demarche at the Conference on European Security last month in Stockholm (in which he said that the territories of the former USSR comprise the sphere of influence of Russia, which will aspire to recreate the federation on this territory by any means) serves as a kind of demonstration for Americans that excessive activity on their part with respect to Ukraine will not be tolerated. Having pushed Moscow out of virtually every corner of the world, Washington left it the so-called CIS and the Baltic states. For the Americans to step in with both feet into this region as well by concluding a military agreement directly with Ukraine would mean utterly humiliating and offending the imperial dignity of Russia, whose general public—cook and general alike—regards Kiev as its "own," even if temporarily lost.

The main flaw in the "double-wing" policy being implemented by our leaders is that it anticipates good relations

between the two guarantors of our security. But this, in turn, depends solely on the political situation in Russia. Comparing our large neighbor to an elephant, Leonid Kravchuk believes that this will be a "wise elephant." Thus the President's desire to promote democratic processes in Russia by "binding" Russia with certain international obligations of a democratic nature in the triangle of Moscow-Kiev-Washington is understandable.

Unfortunately, however, faith is no more than faith. I think that it is always necessary to take into account the worst possible alternative. Consequently, logic demands that any guarantees given by Russia be "fitted" not only to Yeltsin's team, but also to those who are breathing hard down his neck. And, as we know, there are no such things as duties and obligations as far as fervent Bolsheviks are concerned. They will repudiate them as easily and readily as they did in 1917 when they refused to pay off the tsarist debts. Moreover, they will "justify" their actions by claiming that "we are saving the Fatherland"...

Now let us examine who are the supporters of our posthaste disarmament inside Ukraine. Which deputies insisted on including the position on our non-nuclear status into the military doctrine of Ukraine by putting brutal pressure on the minister of defense? Ostroshchenko, Marchenko, Moroz, and other advocates of "Moscow-style" friendship of peoples, as well as Hrynyov, the champion of "universal human values," who declared on the eve of the presidential election: "If Ukraine were to create her own nuclear force, I would be the first to vote in favor of an economic blockade of Ukraine!"

President Kravchuk's position is understandable. He wants to enhance our prestige by creating an image for Ukraine as the first state in human history voluntarily to rid itself of nuclear arms. But the whole point is that the world does not regard these weapons as ours, as belonging to Ukraine... Andrei Kozyrev speaks of "Russian missiles in Ukraine," while the American press speculates—will Ukraine "return" these weapons to Russia or "not return" them...

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which should be responding to this with appropriate explanations and statements and taking the opportunity to open the eyes of the West and our own people in popular form to the contribution made by our nation to the creation of these nuclear weapons, remains silent as if struck dumb.

Reminding everyone that "we do not have direct control over the nuclear weapons on our territory," Leonid Kravchuk underscored that we "could take the necessary steps to make it our own force, but we have chosen not to do so"... Too bad. If we made 1,656 units of nuclear weapons on missiles and strategic bombers our own and then handed them over, we would really impress the world... For all that, hope dies last. And so, on the eve of the consideration of the START I agreement by the Supreme Council of Ukraine the question arises: why

should our deputies not apply the political experience of the United States? At one time, the Americans inked all aspects of bilateral relations with Moscow to observance of human rights by the USSR. Why shouldn't our deputies link nuclear disarmament (and this is a matter not only of weapons, but also of property) to the question of the human rights of one of the largest nations in Europe? To the consequences of the unilateral proclamation of Russia to be the legal heir of the USSR, the division of the supplies of gold and diamonds, the division of foreign assets, the question of returning Ukraine's relics and treasures? Why should we not try to use the "nuclear" link to pull up the entire chain of our unsolved problems with Russia and settle them in a comprehensive manner, as one package?

Nor should we forget that "Uncle Scrooge" is offering us a total of 175 million dollars to pay for our disarmament, while our experts have calculated that this will cost ten times more. When we speak of processing 100,000 metric tons of highly toxic missile fuel, we should remember that the amount needed to destroy chemical weapons in the United States has been valued at 8 billion dollars...

The refusal of the Supreme Soviet to ratify the START I agreement at the demand of Moscow and Washington would only give the President additional arguments in future negotiations with Russia and the United States.

While we are proving our incredible pacifism, the number of nuclear countries is gradually growing. According to a report by NBC, Pakistan has at least seven nuclear weapons. In the opinion of Western experts, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea may join the nuclear club in a year's time... And who is in line behind us to disarm? Hallo!...

No answer.

Anti-START Sentiment Growing

934K0187A Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
26 Jan 93 p 2

[Article by Viktor Myronchenko under the rubric "Point of View": "Does Ukraine Need Nuclear Weapons?"]

[Text] Up to now, the answer given by the current membership of the Ukrainian parliament to the question posed in the title has been a clear and unequivocal: "No, she does not." The Ukrainian parliament endorsed this position officially in several fundamental documents.

Thus, in section 9 of the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine, which deals with external and internal security, we read:

"1. The Ukrainian SSR solemnly proclaims its intention to become in the future a neutral state that does not participate in military blocs and adheres to three non-nuclear principles: not to accept, not to produce, and not to acquire nuclear weapons."

The Statement of the Supreme Council on the nuclear-free status of Ukraine, issued on 24 October 1991, states: "Ukraine will pursue a policy aimed at the complete destruction of nuclear weapons and the components of their deployment, located on the territory of the Ukrainian state. She undertakes to do so in shortest possible time, based on her legal, technical, financial, organizational, and other possibilities and with the proper safeguards for environmental safety."

The statement issued by the Supreme Council on 20 December 1991 in conjunction with Ukraine's signing of the agreement on the commonwealth of independent states [as published] states: "8. Ukraine will strive to attain the status of a non-nuclear state by means of destroying all nuclear arsenals under effective international supervision and on the basis of the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine will not participate in military blocs." Further, "13. What has been stated in points 1-13 of this declaration constitutes an official interpretation of the Minsk agreement and is binding on the President of Ukraine, the Prime Minister of Ukraine, and other structural components of executive power."

Small wonder that we often hear such statements from the President and high-ranking officials during their trips abroad or in conversations with important foreigners, who, incidentally, often come here with only one purpose in mind—to obtain a reply to the question "when will Ukraine finally liquidate its nuclear weapons along with all the enterprises in the military-industrial complex?"

However, the more parliament, the President, and the government persist in affirming Ukraine's nuclear-free status, the greater the number of doubts that are emerging among the general public of Ukraine regarding the soundness of this course. These doubts have now infiltrated even parliament, which until quite recently was unanimous on this issue. A striking example of the collapse of this unanimity was the last parliamentary discussion (28 October 1992) on Ukraine's military-political doctrine and, in particular, the speech by General Volodymyr Tolubko.

Major General Volodymyr Tolubko is a deputy to the Supreme Council of Ukraine and a member of the Military Commission of the Ukrainian Parliament. He is the director of a military school and a candidate of technical sciences.

In a well thought-out speech, the general gave a brief and reasoned presentation of his view of Ukraine's military doctrine, stressing that the declaration of independence is only half the story. The second half consists in the ability of the Ukrainian state to defend its independence.

In the general's view, Ukraine must not have the reputation of a weak state. To avoid aggressive external attacks, it must respond appropriately to all threats. No one must doubt Ukraine's ability to firmly repulse any aggressor should the need arise to do so.

According to the general, nuclear weapons should remain in the Ukrainian army's arsenal and serve as a means of stimulation [as published—"stymulyuvannya" should probably read "strymuuvannya" - deterrence or containment]. Moreover, he believes that to attain the required level of defense capability, it also necessary to adopt a military-political decision on the inexpediency of the complete liquidation of nuclear weapons by Ukraine before effective guarantees of its national security are established.

In support of his view, Volodymyr Tolubko reminded everyone that the Declaration on State Sovereignty, which speaks of the fact that Ukraine will be nuclear-free and unaligned, was adopted at a time when Ukraine was part of the USSR as a Union republic. Its integrity and inviolability were then guaranteed by the entire political, economic, and military might of the Union. Today, on the other hand, there exists the danger that Ukraine will be left without modern means of military defense. Words alone will not solve the problem of ensuring a defense capability.

In view of these circumstances, the general proposed to write into Ukraine's military-political doctrine that the Ukrainian state aspires to become a non-nuclear state in the future, but that at present, because of a lack of effective national security guarantees, it must conduct the reduction of its nuclear potential on the basis of parity with other nuclear states—Russia, Great Britain, France...

As the newspapers reported later, the effect of the general's speech on parliament was like that of a nuclear explosion. The arguments and facts he cited forced the deputies to give serious thought to the decision they had adopted earlier, call a halt to the discussion on the draft of the doctrine, and request that more work be done on it.

At the same time, the speech prompted the appearance in the press of articles, whose authors analyze the possible consequences of Ukraine's refusal to proclaim its nuclear-free status. Some of them, such as Yu. Ruban for example, believe that the dismantling of Ukraine's nuclear shield will bring billions in income from the sale of uranium obtained from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, and, conversely, that the desire to retain nuclear weapons will reduce Ukraine to beggary. Writing in HOLOS UKRAYINY on 3 November 1992, he states bluntly that Ukraine is unable and incapable of creating a nuclear complex like the one that it took the whole Soviet empire more than half a century to develop.

Finding himself at the center of public attention and a kind of rallying point for all those advocating that Ukraine retain her nuclear status, the general had to respond to these charges and give an unequivocal answer to the question whether a nuclear-missile shield was within Ukraine's power. And he gave this answer. In an interview published in KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI on 6 November 1992, we read: "As a military specialist,

particularly in the field of nuclear missiles, I assert that Ukraine has the ability to retain her nuclear arms. There are no problems in this sphere that cannot be solved by the military-industrial complex. This is not an empty statement. Our commission held meetings with representatives of the military-industrial complex, and similar meeting were held with the President. If the task is posed in specific terms, it is technically well within our power.

"As to the political aspect, in accordance with the agreement signed at the time of the division of the Soviet Union, everything located on the territory of each state belongs to that state. The launcher silos are on the territory of our state and therefore belong to Ukraine... Ukraine has been a nuclear state since 1960, and it legally remains such to this day."

Incidentally, in this same interview, the general charged Dmytro Pavlychko, the chairman of the Standing Commission on Foreign Affairs, with exceeding his authority and misleading the world public about Ukraine's intention to become a non-nuclear state. He noted that the parliamentary statement of 24 October 1991 speaks only of Ukraine's intention to become in the future a non-nuclear, nonaligned, neutral country. But when this "future" is to be is not specified in the statement: whether tomorrow, 10 years from now, or 100 years from now.

According to the general, everything else, all the documents signed on this account, are the work of one man—Pavlychko, who, in the general's words, "without the knowledge of parliament (and only this body can vote on whether Ukraine should be a nuclear or nuclear-free state) and to boost his own popularity, began to press the Ministry of Foreign Affairs without the knowledge of the deputies and to force the Ministry of Defense without the necessary expert assessment to sign agreements that impair Ukraine's defense capability." The general believes that Pavlychko should be held accountable by the parliament and the people as to where he got the authority to do what he did.

Subsequently, the general expressed well-grounded criticism of the principle of Ukraine's nuclear-free status in a series of three articles under the common title "Concern for Security, or Back to the Phalanx?" They were published by the newspaper HOLOS UKRAYINY on 10, 20, and 21 November 1992.

Debating with those who support Ukraine's nuclear-free status, the general draws attention to events that have been taking place in the world in recent months. According to him, these events demonstrate that reliance on force, especially on nuclear force, remains unchanged in the policies of most countries. In particular, evidence of this can be seen in the programs for the reconstruction and modernization of nuclear forces adopted by Great Britain and France, which have a sufficient nuclear potential. The world's leading nuclear power, the United States, is also continuing to finance military programs,

scientific research, and experimental design work for the benefit of the defense department [as published].

The question thus arises: "Against whom do France and England plan to defend themselves, and whom do they intend to fight with nuclear weapons? Why do these states have the right to possess nuclear weapons, and why are they not being asked, as is Ukraine, to destroy them? Is not Ukraine also a European state and a member of the United Nations since 1945?"

Today's leaders of nuclear states believe that their strategic nuclear forces ensure deterrence from aggression, as well as protection against political and economic blackmail from outside. Yet another question arises: does Ukraine not face the same problem?

Answering these questions, the general concludes: "In order to be a state that the world community will reckon with and talk with as an equal, Ukraine must have nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. These are not the ambitions of our country's military-industrial circles. This decision is essential to the preservation of state independence and the stability of the state in the immediate future. Moreover, not only military and political stability, but also economic stability."

The opponents of nuclear weapons quite often argue that such weapons and their delivery systems are quite expensive and burdensome for the budget of a fledgling state. But as rudimentary calculations cited by the general show, the costs of producing and operating missile systems, the political and economic advantages of maintaining nuclear missiles are obvious [as published].

Thus, the cost of maintaining the strategic nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union came to 6-8 percent of the total cost of maintaining the entire Armed Forces. The annual cost of the operation and military training of conventional forces was several times higher than the cost of maintaining strategic nuclear forces.

It might be added to what has been said above that the possession of nuclear weapons has enabled England to reduce its army to 320,000 men and to plan to cut this force by an additional 40,000 persons. In the absence of nuclear weapons, such cuts would be virtually impossible.

These are real statistics, and they attest that nuclear weapons permit a country to reduce its defense spending. You must admit that for our state, which is only just rising to its feet, given our condition of economic ruin, retaining our nuclear capability is the most expedient variant of military building and national security.

To be sure, if we disregard statistics and allow ourselves to be guided by emotion, we can demolish our missile systems, destroy our nuclear stockpile, and be rewarded for our "obedience" with another basket of humanitarian aid. Quite understandably, the general does not find this prospect attractive, inasmuch as he believes that Ukraine can and should "thanks to its powerful and

modern weaponry, sit at the negotiating table as an equal partner and receive large credits rather than humanitarian handouts, buy new technology and know-how, create its own economic base and maintain it without fear of any attack or political dictate."

It is also important to know what conclusions the general draws from his analysis of the situation in neighboring states. As we know, this situation is complicated by the fact that Russia, Ukraine's immediate neighbor, has not yet made a final choice between a democratic and an imperialistic course of development. Russia has not irrevocably given up its claims to Ukraine. Moreover, there are internal processes taking place in Russia that threaten the collapse of the state; Russia is involved in numerous national conflicts in the Transcaucasus, Moldova, and Central Asia. As a result, Russia is a constant source of instability and potential external threat to the Ukrainian state.

Nor is it a secret that territorial claims appear from time to time on the pages of irresponsible newspapers in Poland, Hungary, Rumania... All that is lacking is for Turkey, in addition to Russia, to also lay claim to the Crimea. It seems that, except for Belarus, we do not have a single neighbor who, in one form or another, has not expressed a claim to the Ukrainian tidbit.

"The complex situations in neighboring states," concludes General Tolubko "make it imperative for us to strengthen our country's defense capability and enhance the military preparedness of our Armed Forces. This is an additional argument in favor of retaining nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine. The presence of such weapons forces other states to give more careful thought to the possible consequences of military conflicts and to avoid adventurist actions against a nuclear power. On the other hand, the lack of such a deterrent may lead to a situation in which the fate of Ukraine will again be controlled by an outside force, and we have no way of knowing whether this force will be more benevolent than our former 'older brother.'"

Finally, why should Ukraine give up its nuclear weapons when dozens of countries want to possess such weapons? According to General Tolubko's data, today 30 countries are ready in the scientific technical sense to produce nuclear weapons, and nearly 15 countries are on threshold of creating their own nuclear weapons.

"Today," stressed the general, "Ukraine needs neither to obtain from somebody, nor to build, nor to buy nuclear weapons. She does not need to do so because we already have such weapons and we are already a full-fledged nuclear power. If, however, we now give up our nuclear capability, we will lose it forever and irrevocably."

On the whole, sharing the general's opinion, we ask: how can anyone regard as wise a military policy that would deprive the young Ukrainian state of a modern nuclear-missile shield and that would necessitate creating an army of many thousands lacking modern weapons? Just think, why should we give up nuclear-missile weapons

when we have at our disposal our own nuclear mines [yaderni kopalni], first-class missile equipment and strategic aircraft, mighty missile building plants, a large scientific and design potential, qualified workers and engineers, and an officer cadre that is highly skilled in handling nuclear-missile weapons?

Does this not resemble the actions of some imaginary state that has supplies of gunpowder but hands over its rifles to a neighboring empire and arms its own army with spears and swords?

Has history taught us nothing? Do we really want to leave ourselves completely defenseless before our neighbors, who even today do not hide their intentions towards the "naïve little provincial"?

Is there really anyone who cherishes the hope that the Germans, Americans, or French will defend us from a potential aggressor? Or that their combined forces will do so? Did they not defend us splendidly in 1918? The same will happen today if the situation becomes serious. No one will be willing to fight for the interests of a naïve and shortsighted Ukraine.

In conclusion, we will add that not everyone in Ukraine thinks as does General Tolubko. Nevertheless, he succeeded in sensing and conveying the sentiments of a significant portion of Ukrainian society that is prepared to make certain sacrifices and endure certain privations with respect to its prosperity for the sake of ensuring the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. The general's speech in parliament, followed by his published articles, increased the number of his supporters—among ordinary voters, military personnel, politicians, scientists, and, most important, among the deputies to the Supreme Council.

Soon the Ukrainian parliament will resume its deliberations concerning Ukraine's military doctrine. And then we will certainly get a definitive answer to the question "Does Ukraine need nuclear weapons?"

Envoy to Moscow Seeks Russian Guarantees

OW1802192593 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1748 GMT 18 Feb 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukrainian Ambassador to Russia Vladimir Kryzhanovsky said the Ukrainian parliament's ratification of the START-I treaty is being held up by the lack of corresponding guarantees from Russia. In an interview with INTERFAX Thursday [18 February] he listed the three points on which Kiev is insisting: military assistance from Russia in the event of an attack against Ukraine, a promise that Moscow will not put economic pressure on Kiev, and a guarantee of Ukraine's territorial integrity and the inviolability of the country's borders with Russia.

According to Kryzhanovsky, the Russian president himself offered to give Ukraine these guarantees. "We will

wait for them, since it would be awkward for us to go against the wishes of the Russian president," said the ambassador.

Concerning the reports that 16 missile silos on Ukrainian territory are not up to security regulations, the ambassador warned against "dramatizing the situation." "We hope," Kryzhanovsky said, "that a corresponding agreement on servicing missile sites will be signed with the Russian Defense Minister in the near future." He pledged, "the problem will be solved, and there will not be another Chernobyl." The ambassador also reported that the Russian and Ukrainian prime ministers will be meeting in the near future "in Tyumen, Surgut, and Orenburg." He said he hoped that Chernomyrdin would reconsider the decision to supply Ukraine with only 15 million tons of oil. "There will be famine in Ukraine if they leave us without fuel," warned Kryzhanovsky, "and Russia hardly wants this."

Institute Head, U.S. General Comment

AU2502104693 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY
in Ukrainian 19 Feb 93 p 2

[Article by Olena Hubina: "To Some People, the Disarmament of Ukraine Looks Like a Striptease"]

[Text] The view that, by giving away its nuclear missiles, Ukraine is virtually stripping itself naked is one that is held by Ukrainian politicians. However, it seems that increasing numbers of our citizens are beginning to share this opinion. Last summer, opinion polls indicated that one out of every six or seven Kiev citizens held this opinion, but, by the end of the year, this figure had already risen to one out of every three. Journalists tried to come up with their own explanation for this phenomenon during the first meeting of the National Press Club which was organized jointly with the Center for Creative Television and the UNIAN [Ukraine Independent Information Agency]. U.S. General Mykola Kravtsiv [Amerykanskyy heneral Mykola Kravtsiv] and Ukrainian political scientist Dmytro Vydrin were guests of the club. In the opinion of General Kravtsiv, the failure by Ukraine to ratify the START I treaty has been very damaging for its international image, although our country's position is understandable: In the United States, this treaty had been discussed for a long time before it was ratified. Ukraine was only able to express its attitude to it after independence. Dmytro Vydrin suggested that nuclear disarmament should be regarded not only as a political or military problem, but also as a psychological one. For a long time, all of us took pride in the power and quantity of our missiles and not in our standard of living.

However, the situation must also be seen in the context of the present political situation, the journalists stressed. It may seem in general that one year ago Ukraine was much closer to acquiring a nuclear-free status than it is now. However, after obtaining state independence, we succumbed to euphoria and believed that the world community was dreaming of admitting Ukraine into the

circle of civilized and developed countries. However, this is not the case and today our state appears in the world arena in just two cases: the Ukrainian troops within the UN Forces in Yugoslavia and in connection with the ratification of the START Treaty. After Ukraine signs the treaty, interest in it will decline.

General Kravtsiv disagrees: Since Ukraine is talking so much about the need for economic reforms, it would be much simpler today to reduce the military expenditure that swallows up a fifth of the gross national income and invest that capital in the development of the economy. Then it would be possible to join the world community thanks to the economic development and not the quantity of missiles.

However, the future fate of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine also depends upon the alignment of forces in the international arena. Dmytro Vydrin calls this "the rules of the game." According to him, if it is strength that determines one's position in international politics, we will simply be compelled to look for some superweapons. Mr. Vydrin heads the International Institute for Global and Regional Security. He says that the institute has elaborated various scenarios for resolving the problems of nuclear weapons. For example, what kind of situation will emerge if Ukraine delays the ratification of the START Treaty or, conversely, if it obeys the demands put forward by the nuclear powers? Even a scenario of how Ukraine may influence the nuclear disarmament of Russia was analyzed. Only one scenario was not discussed: What would happen to the nuclear weapons if the Communists returned to power in Ukraine—this was considered too unlikely.

One of the journalists joked that a possible mistake by Ukraine was the removal of the tactical nuclear weapons from its territory and the retention of the strategic ones. Strategic missiles may hypothetically be used against the United States or China and Mongolia, but we will not be able to defend ourselves if our neighbors make territorial claims upon us. However, strategic missiles worry the West, and we may take advantage of that anxiety in the hope that it is precisely the West that will not allow complete chaos and conflicts to prevail in a state that possesses nuclear missiles. After all, it is precisely this factor of which we have been reminding the West in the hope of getting support and guarantees from it. However, General Kravtsiv cautioned against relying too much upon guarantees and even quoted the sad example that World War II started because England had given Poland guarantees to defend it from aggressors.

What predictions are journalists making on the eve of discussions in the Ukrainian Parliament on the question of ratifying the START Treaty? There may be different opinions, although the majority hold the view that the treaty can be ratified, although with certain reservations—proposed by Ukraine. Ukraine will fulfill the conditions of the treaty if other countries agree to these amendments.

Deputy Foreign Minister Cited

LD2502155093 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 2000 GMT 24 Feb 93

[Excerpts] Ukraine is Turning the West Against Russia—What is the Reality?—this is the title of an article that was published in the pages of ROBITNYCHA HAZETA. Our correspondent Olena Hrytsenko has prepared an account of this article: [passage omitted]

[Hrytsenko] The impression has formed abroad, both far and near—and thanks to the able propaganda of the Russian mass media—that Ukraine is a disobedient state and will not ratify the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and START I. Naturally, these fears are groundless. Our president expressed himself unambiguously on this at talks in Moscow. He said that Ukraine will carry out the obligations in question, but not everything depends on us.

In order to explain in more detail why we cannot deviate from our course of acquiring non-nuclear status, the newspaper refers to the words of Borys Tarasyuk, deputy minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine. Tarasyuk said that the reaction of other states in such a case would, without a doubt, be strongly negative. In fact, we are witnesses to such a reaction now. Incidentally, some of our partners are showing excessive impatience and taking very strong steps. We have not and will not fail to respond, because this is about a normal, gradual process, Tarasyuk said, which clearly requires exceptional thought and responsibility.

Ratification Possibly Delayed

OW2402165793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1558 GMT 24 Feb 93

[Report prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A leading member of the parliamentary commission on foreign affairs, Bogdan Goryn, believes that the Ukrainian president's statement as to the speedy ratification of the START-I treaty was "premature". "The president said so, because his station prompts this," the parliamentarian told the local press. According to him, parliamentary debates on the politico-legal, economic and military aspects of the treaty will take a long time. Goryn could not indicate even tentatively when the possible ratification of START-I might take place.

INTERFAX Note: At one of his recent meetings with journalists Leonid Kravchuk said: "Western concern in connection with the process of this treaty's ratification is understandable, since the emergence of several nuclear states in the former USSR might upset the balance of forces and call in question the agreements reached in the area of disarmament and nuclear arms non-proliferation." "I cannot allow Ukraine to take such an irresponsible step, as refusal to ratify START-I," the president

said in mid February upon his return to Kiev from London. Nevertheless Kravchuk dismisses the allegations that the West, particularly Britain and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, link the issue of aid to Ukraine to the ratification of START-1 by the Ukrainian parliament.

In the agenda of the parliamentary session that began on February 16 the following issues were given top priority: elections to the Constitutional Court; draft bill on the cabinet of ministers; amendments and addenda to the bills on the privatization of housing and on military service; amendments and addenda to the Civil and Criminal Codes.

Supreme Council Prepares for START I Debate

*LD2602124593 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 0800 GMT 26 Feb 93*

[Text] The preparatory period for holding hearings regarding ratification of START I, the treaty on reducing strategic offensive weapons, is continuing at the Ukraine Supreme Council. A large group of experts, among whom are well-known politologists, scientists, and military specialists, have been brought into this analytical work. It concerns the necessity of all around studying and (?taking into account) the whole complex of external political, economic, and technical issues. A special parliamentary commission is preparing all of the proper documents for presentation to the session sittings of the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

Deputy Foreign Minister: Russia 'Blocking' Ratification

*LD0303113293 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1000 GMT 3 Mar 93*

[Text] According to Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Tarasyuk, Russia is blocking Kiev's ratification of the START I nuclear disarmament treaty by refusing to give Ukraine sufficient guarantees of security. Yesterday Tarasyuk told AFP that Ukraine wanted to ease world tension by ratifying START I, but should not forget about guarantees of her national interests.

Further on Russian-Ukrainian START I Implementation Talks

No Progress Reported

*LD2402203693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
2030 GMT 24 Feb 93*

[Text] Moscow February 24 TASS—A joint Russian-Ukrainian working group set up to oversee the elimination of nuclear warheads held a session in Moscow on Wednesday [24 February] to discuss the removal, transportation and elimination of nuclear warheads stationed in Ukraine, the press service of the Russian Foreign Ministry said.

At the first round of talks held in Kiev between January 26-27, 1993, the Ukrainian side pledged to announce its position on the scale and terms of elimination of strategic offensive weapons temporarily deployed in Ukraine. However it failed to do so on Wednesday. Moreover, it turned [out] to be unprepared to discuss this issue which is directly connected with its obligations under the Lisbon Protocol obliging it to guarantee the elimination of all nuclear weapons stationed on its territory, including strategic offensive weapons within 7 years as envisaged by the START Treaty.

Such position of the Ukrainian side obstructs further progress in the talks, the press service said.

Russia Blames Kiev

*OW2402194593 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1928 GMT 24 Feb 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In the negotiations process between Russia and Ukraine on the implementation of the START-I Treaty "the Ukrainian party's position prevented us from moving forward to the discussion of important issues" at a session of a working group on the issues of the dismantling, transport, and destruction of nuclear warheads and parts of missile sites in Ukraine which was held Wednesday [24 February] in Moscow. So stated the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department of Press and Information.

During the first round of negotiations in Kiev on January 26-27 the Ukrainian party promised to present their stance on the levels and deadlines for the destruction of strategic offensive weapons temporarily located on Ukrainian territory.

During a session of the working group on February 24, notes a statement issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department of Press and Information, it became clear that Kiev had not fulfilled this promise. Moreover, the Ukrainian party "in general seemed unprepared to discuss issues directly related to Ukraine's responsibilities, as stipulated by the Lisbon Protocol, to guarantee the destruction of all nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive weapons located on Ukrainian territory in accordance with agreements reached on this issue and within 7 years, as this is stipulated by the START Treaty."

Shaposhnikov Backs Grachev on Talks

*LD0203170393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1527 GMT 2 Mar 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Vadim Byrkin and Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow, 2 Mar (ITAR-TASS)—The second round of Russo-Ukrainian talks on strategic forces began today at Arkhangelskoye near Moscow. The Russian side

at the talks is headed by Colonel General Boris Gromov, the deputy minister of defense.

As we have already reported, Army General Pavel Grachev, Russia's minister of defense, told journalists this morning that if the problem of control over strategic nuclear forces deployed in the Ukraine is not resolved positively at the talks, he will issue a special statement to the press.

"I am prepared to subscribe to every single word of the statement which Defense Minister Pavel Grachev intends to make in the event that the Russo-Ukrainian talks on nuclear weapons reach deadlock, and I am aware of what the statement says. But it would be preferable if this statement were not made by the minister of defense but by a political leader." This was what Air Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, said today when asked by an ITAR-TASS correspondent to comment on the Russian minister's position.

U.S.-Russian Agreement on Uranium From Nuclear Weapons

*LD1902132393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1323 GMT 19 Feb 93*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Vanichkin]

[Text] Washington February 19 TASS—A Russian-U.S. intergovernmental agreement on the use of highly enriched uranium extracted from nuclear weapons was signed here on Thursday. This is Russia's first agreement concluded with the new U.S. Administration.

The agreement envisages the processing of highly enriched uranium, extracted from nuclear weapons that are subject to cutback, at domestic enterprises into a low-enriched one for subsequent application as fuel in nuclear reactors under contracts of the U.S. Department of Energy and private firms, Viktor Mikhailov, Russian minister for nuclear energy, who signed the document, told ITAR-TASS.

In the coming 5 years, 50 metric tonnes of weapon-grade uranium are to be processed to the tune of about one billion U.S. dollars, Mikhailov said.

To implement the agreement one will have to choose a form of cooperation between Russian and U.S. businesses which will result in a maximum economic return, including an increase in the quota of the export of Russian uranium to the world market.

With a view to implementing the agreement, Russia and the U.S. intend to conclude contracts to specify the trade and economic aspects of the agreement, the organisational-legal forms of cooperation, measures to meet non-proliferation requirements, physical protection, stock taking of nuclear materials and control over them, and environmental protection.

From strategic point of view, the agreement will make it possible to ensure an inflow of hard currency to Russia, and reach out to the world market of uranium, the minister pointed out.

Russian enterprises will be able to provide workload for enterprises processing highly enriched uranium into nuclear-power-station fuel. And finally, close cooperation with U.S. producers on the market of uranium products will be established, Mikhailov said.

Belarusian Chairman on Nuclear Disarmament

Reiterates Aim To Remove All Nuclear Arms

*OW1902175893 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1705 GMT 19 Feb 93*

[Report prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpt] Speaking yesterday over national TV, the speaker of Belarusian parliament Stanislav Shushkevich reiterated his intention to seek the complete removal of nuclear arms from the republic. "No one is frightened by nuclear power any more. Civilized society does not need it," said the speaker. He said the Belarusian leadership's position was met with "understanding and support by the world community." He denied accusations of his involvement in the collapse of the Soviet Union. He believes "the Soviet Union was broken by its former leaders and it was impossible to support its ruins." The speaker said it would be better to live in the CIS than in the USSR. [passage omitted]

Reasserts 'No Gambling' Policy

*OW2402164093 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1555 GMT 24 Feb 93*

[Report prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpt] Leader of the Belarusian Parliament Stanislav Shushkevich has rejected offers for the sale of nuclear and conventional weapons via broker-countries, chairman of the parliamentary commission for national policy and CIS affairs Mikhail Slemnev said speaking in an exclusive interview with Interfax.

He also spoke of a string of proposals by leading deputies and separate factions to declare ownership of the nuclear weapons deployed in the country to make the international community reckon Belarus as a large nuclear power. The parliamentary official said that there was no change in Shushkevich's tough policy of no gambling with nuclear weapons. [passage omitted]

Kazakhstan Seeks 'Absolute' Security, Financial Guarantees for START I

*OW1902181593 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1706 GMT 19 Feb 93*

[Report prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] President Nursultan Nazarbayev has proposed holding a conference on confidence building measures in Asia that would contribute to political and economic stability in the Central Asian region. Russia, China, India, and Central Asian countries could attend the conference. The head of state made this statement at a news conference in Alma-Ata on Thursday [18 Feb] when he told journalists of his European and Middle East tour. He said that a group of Foreign Ministry experts had been negotiating the convening of such a conference with interested countries.

The president also emphasized that the conference was not designed to be an alternative to the CSCE. Ideally, the Asian conference and CSCE will cooperate.

INTERFAX Note: Originally, Nazarbayev proposed holding a representative international forum on cooperation and confidence building measures in Asia at the 47th session of the UN General Assembly.

Nazarbayev confirmed Kazakhstan's commitment to START 1 and the Lisbon Protocol. He emphasized that his country needed absolute security guarantees in the case of the threat of war as well as financial and technical U.S. aid in dismantling and eliminating nuclear weapons.

INTERFAX Note: This issue was also discussed at President Nazarbayev's meeting with William Courtney, U.S. Ambassador in Alma-Ata. The ambassador handed the Kazakh leader a personal message from Bill Clinton. The U.S. President is highly appreciative of bilateral economic and cultural relations and expressed the hope that Kazakhstan would continue the policy of eliminating nuclear weapons.

Kazakhstan's president thinks that the reduction and elimination of nuclear missiles in his country must be contingent on the funds allotted by the U.S. for this purpose. (The Senator Lugar Foundation was set up in the U.S. which will channel \$800 Mn [million] to CIS member nations to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons - IF). Nazarbayev said that it was not known what amount was earmarked for Kazakhstan.

President Nazarbayev also wanted expensive nuclear fuel in missiles to be put to peaceful uses in the national economy and missiles now in silos, to be used to boost nonmilitary satellites for commercial purposes.

Nazarbayev said that he would send a message on these matters shortly to the American president.

Ukrainian Reaction to IZVESTIYA Report on ICBM Hazards

Defense Ministry: No 'Second Chernobyl'

*OW2002180393 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1717 GMT 20 Feb 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The statement of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry distributed in Kiev cites that the responsibility for the security of the nuclear weapons stationed on the territory of Ukraine should be placed on Russia. The difficulties which the republic is experiencing due to the poor technical maintenance of the rocket complexes are caused by the shortages in deliveries of necessary components and spare parts from Russia.

The statement emphasizes that the messages of the Russian mass media about the possibility of "a second Chernobyl" at Ukraine's missile complexes are groundless. During their last meeting in Moscow the Presidents of both countries reached an agreement to develop the logistic system in order to supply Ukrainian missiles with necessary Russian spare parts. The state commission of Russia and Ukraine have already conducted the first round of negotiations on security problems and on implementation of the provisions of the START-1 Treaty.

The Ukrainian Defense Ministry is convinced that today there are no grounds to doubt as both neighboring friendly states can ensure appropriate security of nuclear missiles stationed in Ukraine.

'Difficulties' Servicing Nuclear Arms

*LD2002080293 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0500 GMT 20 Feb 93*

[Text] The Ukrainian Defense Ministry has confirmed some difficulties in servicing the former USSR's nuclear warheads on the republic's territory. However, a Defense Ministry spokesman refuted the possibility of a nuclear incident, as mentioned in IZVESTIYA recently. The ministry spokesman noted that the absence of spare parts from Russia made servicing the nuclear warheads difficult.

The spokesman did not define precisely which spare parts he meant. Another Ukrainian military department spokesman earlier this week partially confirmed the IZVESTIYA report which stated that the schedule for servicing the missiles has not been followed. Faults were discovered in 19 of the missiles during checks.

Text of Defense Ministry Statement

*PM0203124593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
25 Feb 93 p 2*

[Ukrainian Defense Ministry Press Service statement, accompanied by introduction and editorial office comment: "Ukrainian Defense Ministry Rebuts IZVESTIYA Article Via Its Own Newspaper"]

[Text] On 16 February 1993 IZVESTIYA published an article by Viktor Litovkin entitled "Second Chernobyl Brewing in Ukraine's Missile Silos." That article, NARODNA ARMIYA says, could have broad political repercussions and cause alarm in the world community over the nuclear and environmental safety of strategic nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine.

Kiev, 23 February—The Ukrainian Defense Ministry Press Service is authorized to state that the IZVESTIYA article is not in keeping with the spirit of relations existing between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the question of guaranteeing the safety of nuclear weapons and reports incorrectly the cause of the existing difficulties in guaranteeing nuclear safety.

A meeting between state delegations of Ukraine and the Russian Federation headed by Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin was held on 15 January 1993. For the purpose of guaranteeing the nuclear and ecological safety of the strategic nuclear forces in Ukraine and Russia, the sides agreed to specify a system of material and technical backup and implementation of work to ensure the supervision of the operation of the strategic nuclear forces' missile systems in accordance with the warranties and as specified by the designers. The governments of Ukraine and the Russian Federation were instructed to prepare and conclude specific agreements to ensure the implementation of this accord.

The Ukrainian and Russian Federation state commissions have already conducted the first round of talks on problems of ensuring nuclear and environmental security and fulfilling the terms of the START Treaty since its ratification by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. A draft agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on material and technical backup and supervision in accordance with the warranties and as specified by the designers has been prepared, and constructive dialogue and a search for mutually acceptable solutions regarding all questions connected with nuclear weapons are under way.

Ukraine is indeed experiencing certain difficulties in ensuring technical backup for combat missile systems. These difficulties are due to the disruption of economic links between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, as a consequence of which units of the Strategic Missile Forces in Ukraine have been unable to obtain promptly components and spare parts produced on the territory of the Russian Federation. For that reason responsibility for the safety of nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine should be equally shared by the Ukrainian and Russian sides.

In preparing the article on nuclear missiles in Ukraine the IZVESTIYA journalist did not contact the Ukrainian Defense Ministry and expressed a subjective, one-sided view of the problem in his article. He did not have sufficient grounds to talk about a real threat of nuclear catastrophe at missile force facilities in Ukraine.

The question of the future of nuclear weapons is not an idle one and there is no room for any deception herein. It cannot be interpreted in a vague way or contain ambiguity. Both Ukraine and Russia are convinced of this.

As of today there are no grounds for doubting that the two neighboring friendly states are capable of guaranteeing the complete nuclear and environmental safety of nuclear weapons.

From the editorial office:

While publishing this statement we are obliged to acknowledge that it bears... no relation whatsoever to the article by our IZVESTIYA military correspondent entitled "Second Chernobyl Brewing in Ukraine's Missile Silos," as that article—from its first to its last line—touched on the military technical and economic aspects of the safety of nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine: For example, the fact that 16 SS-24 missile launchers on alert status in Pervomaysk have overrun the scheduled inspection and maintenance date by 8 to 10 months or the fact that the defense and protection systems at 20 launchpads have been defective for more than two months now...

These and other more than alarming facts were, clearly, not invented by the journalist. The article was based on facts uncovered by investigation carried out by specialists of the Strategic Missile Forces Main Staff. And the conclusions about the potential for disasters involving nuclear weapons were drawn by those people vested with legal authority.

However, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry has preferred not to notice the obvious, switching the argument about the state of the missiles from the military technical to the political plane. Incidentally, the repeated attempts by the author of the article to obtain at least some comment at the Ukrainian Defense Ministry ended each time with a categorical refusal. On 23 February, when Litovkin tried to get through on a military line to Lieutenant General Aleksey Kryzhko, chief of the center of the Administrative Directorate of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Strategic Nuclear Forces, the latter told the caller—and this was heard in Moscow—to say that the general was not in his office.

Alas, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Press Service's official response offers no reassurance on the question of the complete safety of the nuclear missiles.

Ukrainian-Russian Recriminations

PM2202123193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Feb 93 Morning Edition p 2

[Viktor Litovkin report: "Arguments About Missiles Continue. The Danger Remains"]

[Text] Following an article in IZVESTIYA (No. 29 dated 16 February) on the problems of maintaining the nuclear safety of strategic weapons in Ukraine, that country's

Ministry of Defense has still not acknowledged that missiles deployed there on combat alert are in a state of disrepair and that gross violations of the maintenance schedule are occurring on both the SS-24 strategic missiles themselves and on their warheads.

Lieutenant General Aleksey Kryzhko, chief of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Center for the Administrative Command and Control of Strategic Nuclear Forces, has admitted, according to ASSOCIATED PRESS and INTERFAX, that the combat readiness of 16 strategic nuclear missile launch installations is at a low level and another three are simply beyond repair.

According to the general, INTERFAX reports, equipment for them has already been manufactured at a plant in Kharkov, but "owing to a lack of other components" they have not yet been installed. I was told by the duty officer at the Ukrainian center—I was unable to get through to Gen. Kryzhko—that an official answer by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense regarding the newspaper article has been prepared, and the editorial office and authorized foreign representatives will be notified of it.

ASSOCIATED PRESS reports that Ukraine has blamed Russia for the problems which have arisen in connection with the servicing schedule of missile complexes, since Russia has refused to carry out servicing checks until the state status of the strategic nuclear forces stationed on Ukrainian territory has been defined.

For their part, Russian missile launcher crewmen are accusing their Ukrainian colleagues of not concluding appropriate contracts with Russian enterprises for carrying out this work and not allocating the necessary funds for it. Moreover, the Strategic Rocket Forces specialists stress, the SS-24 missiles are assembled at "Yuzhmashzavod" in Dnepropetrovsk, and Stanislav Konyukhov, general designer at the "Yuzhnoye" Design Bureau, is responsible for their care afterwards, but the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has not even allocated enough money to pay for the work of its own specialists or for equipment and spare parts manufactured in this state.

In our opinion, who is right and who is wrong in this dispute is far from the central problem. Behind the mutual recriminations the main point about maintaining the nuclear safety of the missile complexes at Pervomaysk is almost imperceptibly slipping into the background.

We are not just talking about the missiles here, but primarily about their combat warhead parts—dozens of nuclear charges [boyezaryady] in each missile silo housing the SS-24's. Their yield is far higher than that of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima. In line with all nuclear safety regulations, these warheads should be serviced and maintenance work should be carried out on them only at the plants where they were constructed. These plants are not in Ukraine.

Delays lasting many months in carrying out maintenance work on nuclear warheads and replacing parts in them that have reached the end of their guaranteed service life is a very risky business. Specialists are well aware of this.

But it is precisely this question—perhaps the most important one—which is not being resolved in the most basic way.

The problem is the absence of political decisions. Military experts and missile launcher crewmen are saying that all the current problems—whether financial, economic, technical, or operational—have turned into political problems. On both sides, the generals and colonels themselves, fully aware of the consequences that may be caused by delays in resolving the technical issues of ensuring the nuclear safety of the missile complexes, can do nothing however much they may want to.

It is the politicians who must make the decisions. And the sooner the better. But the politicians are temporizing. Why? Nuclear weapons are not like the navy, they cannot be divided up into respective Russian and Ukrainian parts.

Russian Nuclear Scientist Comments

LD0203111593 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 2330 GMT 26 Feb 93

[From the "Top Priority" program]

[Text] Tkachenko: Hello and welcome to Top Priority, I am Irina Tkachenko. The subject for today: The security of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union republics, the security of nuclear missiles in Ukraine, one of the four republics, one of the three outside of Russia that after the breakup of the Soviet Union found themselves all of a sudden in possession of nuclear weapons—strategic as well as conventional ones. Here at the studios of Radio Moscow with me is my guest Dr. Aleksandr (Rumyantsev) of the Russian Scientific Center, better known by its old name the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy. Now, when we look at Ukraine, the country that in its declaration of sovereignty has enshrined as a principle its desire to become a nonnuclear state and has so far refused to identify itself officially as a nonnuclear state. At the moment it insists on being called a country with nuclear weapons on its territory. In the negotiations under way between Russia and Ukraine on the removal and dismantling of strategic nuclear missiles that under the START agreement are to be scrapped—and Ukraine has on its territory 176 strategic missiles—Ukraine is laying down conditions, the bargaining continues. Meanwhile evidence has surfaced quite recently that technical maintenance and the security of nuclear, strategic nuclear missiles on Ukrainian territory have been weakened, are far from perfect and according to the top brass here in the allied command of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, top-level officials are already calling the situation not only complex but unpredictable. Now when I hear Marshal Shaposhnikov saying something like that I get

the jitters and hence my first question to you Dr. (Rumyantsev), what exactly is wrong, what are we talking about when, when we hear the military experts saying: Nobody today can guarantee the security of nuclear missiles in Ukraine?

(Rumyantsev): Any complex technology requires a certain procedure in order to be sure that everything is correct and everything is running in a design fashion. It means that strict observation of all rules concerning such things as control and maintenance of warheads and rockets must be followed up without any exceptions from these strict rules. The probability that perhaps some unexpected events, such as fire, earthquake, errors unavoidable due to deficiencies in the personnel training and so on, is estimated on a level of 10 in power minus 6 [as heard] under almost normal conditions. It means that violation of this strict control and maintenance procedure which has to be conducted on monthly basis, means that if you are not going, or you are not able to follow this procedure for 10 months the probability perhaps an unexpected, an accident, is increased at least by a factor of 10. It means the probability to have some accident is increasing from month to month, from failure in electronic equipment which is used for detonation of nuclear warheads, in electronic equipment which is used for prevention of their unauthorized usage, and so on. To me it is very strange even to hear that such sensitive equipment, such sensitive technology cannot be maintained on appropriate level of safety because of some political and other organizational matters.

Tkachenko: You have described a situation where, as if I understand you right, for 10 months you said, in Ukraine, there have not been the proper timely checkups, technical checkups, that should be conducted on a monthly basis. Is that correct?

(Rumyantsev): This was written down and published in newspaper IZVESTIYA just a few days ago.

Tkachenko: You have given the figures describing the probability of an accident at a nuclear base where the strategic missiles are deployed. Besides saying as one potential cause for this accident of fire, or let us say the intrusion of an outsider, or the lack of skills in the personnel that is supposed to be taking care of the missiles, what exactly happens if a fire breaks out? Can the electronic equipment accidentally, as you have indicated, detonate a warhead? What happens then?

(Rumyantsev): Just before I would like to list in accordance with priority the type of external events which may cause the most significant troubles. First of all that is fire. Second one, so-called electric shock of electrical equipment, developed by any reasons [as heard]. And unauthorized intrusion, it seems to me, is less probable than other reasons. In case of fire the most troublesome consequence of the fire event is dispersion of plutonium from the warheads in form of plutonium dioxide. Plus it may be explosion of usual explosive material, because of unexpected detonation, again provoked by the fire. That

is one of the most probable situations. In this case, dependent upon the wind and other external conditions, meteorological conditions, the dispersed plutonium in the form of dioxide may cover the significant territory around nuclear base.

Tkachenko: So what we are talking about here is not the accidental launching of a missile. Let us define the type of the accident that could happen. But the localized spill out of radioactive material...

(Rumyantsev): [interrupting] Yes....

Tkachenko: [interrupting] That is the most...

(Rumyantsev): [interrupting] That is the most important trouble what has to be expected in case of violation of maintenance and check procedure. One of the most important reasons for fire is violation of check and maintenance procedure. The probability of unexpected launch is decreasing. But the probability of unexpected dispersion of plutonium because of detonation of normal explosive material, not the nuclear material, not, I am not talking about nuclear detonation. I firmly believe that nuclear detonation because of design of Soviet warheads is improbable. But in case of fire, dispersion of plutonium will create immediate, and, er, immediate threat to the local population.

Tkachenko: Why is this happening? Why do you think that the nuclear weapons, the places where the most vigorous, the tightest security is always in place, is falling into disrepair in Ukraine? Is it the lack of understanding or awareness of the risks involved or the lack of money? You said you were outraged by any examples of, of any political motivation for it. Well, if it is not politics, what is it?

(Rumyantsev): Before Chernobyl everybody who was involved in the nuclear technology was almost sure that our installations are as safe as possible. But Chernobyl shows that group actions of irresponsible personnel, who have a certain lack in professional knowledge, who are not well trained and so on and so forth, may lead to unexpected consequences. The same may be said about maintenance of nuclear technology in case of warheads. The basic reason is lack of culture in safety related fields and politicians trying to resolve their personal or, let us say their so-called political problems. They must know that our century is a century of highly complex technologies, some of which are extremely dangerous. The level of danger depends on qualification and mentality of people who are involved in dealing with such sensitive technologies. And nuclear technology is one of them.

Tkachenko: Dr. (Rumyantsev), why is it that we have begun to talk about this only now, the end of February in 1993? After all, the Soviet Union's collapse occurred at the end of 1991. The Ukraine, as well as Russia, has been independent for well over a year. For scientists who specialize in this, who know all of this miles better than

anybody else, who understand the dangers and the risks involved, was it not obvious before that the situation can exacerbate fast?

(Rumyantsev): It seems to me all specialists involved in the warhead safety were well informed about what is going on [words indistinct], but before publication in newspaper IZVESTIYA, a small article about, let us say, violation of the check/maintenance procedure, the people outside have no knowledge about it. All of these things concerning safety and security of warheads are matter of the top secret.

Tkachenko: So what you are saying is, this is only one example of the areas that are still a big secret, that should not be discussed out in public, no matter how dangerous the situation is?

(Rumyantsev): It seems to me we are talking just about the present situation. Present situation is such that safety and security problems sometimes cannot be discussed in public because of secrecy which is necessary in case of dealing with such sensitive technology. But there is a certain area which has to be observed for certain, let us say a level of confidence, what has to be observed by specialists. They are morally obliged to [word indistinct] about such violations in case when politicians are not capable to solve this difficult but solvable problem.

Tkachenko: Now, let me ask you a personal question. Did you personally, or people who work in the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, suspect in any way that things might be going in the wrong direction in Ukraine before this recent publication in IZVESTIYA which basically said the security is weakening?

(Rumyantsev): Because of disappearing of the Soviet Union all of us understood in the past that the whole infrastructure developed for nuclear industry in our country collapsed. A lot of things which was quite natural and quite simple to organize, let us say a few years ago, became extremely difficult. A lot of, let us say, business matters which was more or less simple to resolve a few years ago became unresolvable. In this case guess, only guess, maybe....

Tkachenko: [interrupting] You mean all you could do was guesswork....

(Rumyantsev): [interrupting] Yes, yes, guesswork....

Tkachenko: [interrupting] That's all....

(Rumyantsev): [interrupting] ...guesswork.

Tkachenko: Dr. (Rumyantsev), my probably my last question to you today would be: How long do you think can this situation persist? We have heard just this past week that the Russian Defense Ministry has allocated a sum of money that would be just enough to carry out the basic maintenance procedures of nuclear installations in Ukraine, and Ukraine has agreed to receive Russian technicians and engineers to carry out those check ups. Will this resolve the issue?

(Rumyantsev): In any case these actions will decrease the risk of unexpected events concerning warheads, safety of warheads. But it seems to me we have to distinguish the short-term, the short-term and long-term purposes. To my opinion nuclear arm [as heard] reduction must be, must follow up in the direction which was agreed with Americans. The safety of such sensitive technologies costs much less than any trouble, problems, any kind of disaster.

Tkachenko: Let me remind our listeners that today on Top Priority I have been talking to Dr. Aleksandr (Rumyantsev) of the Russian Scientific Center, also known by its old name as the Institute of Atomic Energy named after Kurchatov. From me, Irina Tkachenko, good-bye and good listening.

Russian Military Figures Criticize START II Treaty

Officers Union Leader Assails U.S.

*OW2002145893 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1415 GMT 20 Feb 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] On Saturday [20 February] several dozens of people in uniform gathered in the building of the former Proletarskiy regional council of Moscow. Stanislav Terekhov, the leader of the Officers Union who chaired the meeting, proclaimed [the] opening of the All-Army Officers Assembly. According to Terekhov, the officers who have come to Moscow "represent practically all military districts and fleets of Russia and of several CIS states." Leaders of several opposition organizations, in particular, Sazhi Umalatova, the leader of the restored Russian Communist Party Gennadiy Zyuganov, Aleksandr Sterligov, and Albert Makashov attended the meeting. The participants of the meeting unanimously elected Stanislav Terekhov as the chairman of the permanent ruling body of the All-Army Officers Assembly.

In his report Terekhov pointed out that "the modern world is nearing a new system headed by the United States" and the third world war—an information-intellectual one—is being waged against Russia; as Terekhov said, "mafia-nomenclature elements" are waging this war inside the country. Terekhov declared that disarmament of the army "is being conducted by means of conclusion of different treaties, like, for example, the START II Treaty, mass discharge of patriotic officers." The participants of the meeting accused the Russian Defense Minister, Pavel Grachev, of "high treason," "corruption" and demanded his resignation. They believe that the whole Cabinet of Ministers also deserves resignation.

In Terekhov's words, this All-Army Officers Assembly should become "an organizational basis for army's revival," it is necessary to create its structures in all military units.

On Sunday the meeting held in the Proletarskiy regional council will continue its work. A press conference is expected to be convened after the participants of the meeting complete their work.

Admiral Deplores 'Haste' in Signing Treaty

PM2602091693 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
23 Feb 93 p 3

[Article by Vice Admiral Rudolf Golosov, Hero of the Soviet Union: "Disarm, But Sensibly. They Forgot the Quality Criterion. Juggling With the Figures Over Reductions in Warheads in START II Misses the Point"]

[Text] The arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons in the world has swelled out of all proportion. It must be reduced, and few people doubt that. In this respect you would think there could be no doubt of the expediency of the START II Treaty, which was signed in a great hurry without waiting for ratification of START I by all the interested states. Some specialists point out, among the other "merits" of the START II Treaty, the fact that for the first time the United States has agreed to cut the naval component of its strategic triad. Let us try to examine more closely these and other "merits" of START II.

As of today, in the U.S. strategic nuclear forces, 20 percent of the warheads are deployed on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's), 55 percent on missiles on missile-carrying submarines, and 25 percent on cruise missiles on strategic bombers. In Russia the corresponding figures are 60 percent, 30 percent, and 10 percent. After implementation of START II the correlation should be in the range of 17 percent, 53 percent, and 30 percent for both sides. In other words, the structure of the U.S. strategic triad remains virtually unchanged. Yet Russia has to drastically change the structure of its own strategic nuclear forces, in effect bringing it into line with the U.S. structure, which, incidentally, they have been trying to bring about for a long time.

You may ask—what is wrong with that? Here's what: The most effective part of Russia's strategic nuclear forces is land-based ICBM's, particularly "heavy" missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. It was these that the United States saw as the greatest danger to itself, and these that Russia mainly has to cut. The United States has long since concealed the main bulk of its own nuclear potential on nuclear missile-carrying submarines, and is now kindly proposing to Russia that it do the same.

To make up its quota under START II (1,700-1,750 warheads on sea-launched missiles), the United States plans to continue until 1997 the construction of sophisticated Ohio class submarines with 24 Trident-2 ballistic missiles. Washington intends to have 18 of these missile-carrying submarines in service, with 432 missiles. The building of submarines for the Russian Navy stopped in 1990, and in order to make up the same quota Russia

will have to keep at least two types of missile submarines (with two different types of missiles) which are unfortunately inferior to America's in a number of indicators, first and foremost because of the manufacturing technology. There is another important point too. The U.S. submarine fleet will patrol in regions where our submarine forces are effectively unable to operate because of the remoteness of their basing system. And the United States, by utilizing the whole infrastructure of its military blocs, can very effectively oppose our missile submarines with antisubmarine nuclear submarines, surface ships, and aircraft.

As for aviation systems, since the disintegration of the USSR the main bulk of strategic aviation formations and bases have remained in Ukraine and Kazakhstan (all the sophisticated Tu-160 bombers, among other things, are in Ukraine). It is not hard to imagine what it would cost Russia to recreate its strategic aviation, if indeed it does so. Furthermore U.S. strategic aviation, using their own and the allied countries' basing system, is capable of strikes against targets on Russia's territory from virtually all directions. Russia's strategic aviation can now use only the Arctic salient for retaliatory strikes.

The START II Treaty says nothing about sea-launched cruise missiles. Nor do those Russian specialists who were overcome by euphoria because of the "reduction" in the naval component of the U.S. strategic triad. Yet the U.S. Navy plans by 1995 to deploy [razvernut] Tomahawk cruise missiles on 150 warships, including 88 multipurpose nuclear submarines. It is envisaged that each submarine will have 12 vertical launchers with Tomahawk missiles. The nuclear version of the missile has a range of 2,600 km, a warhead with a 200-kiloton yield, and a circular error probable of only 35 meters. What is that, if it is not a strategic weapon?

START II does not categorically state that the sides pledge to comply with the provisions of the 1972 Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense (ABM). At the same time work on the SDI program has not stopped in the United States. In our case, because of the disintegration of the USSR, the construction of a number of important facilities for the missile attack warning system has been disrupted. The Americans are enviably consistent in their policy. It was the United States which at one time actively sought an end to the construction of a powerful station for that system in the Krasnoyarsk region. Therefore, without categorical compliance with the ABM Treaty, the START II Treaty is devoid of reason.

The United States has achieved significant success in creating conventionally armed high-precision weapons, especially air- and sea-launched cruise missiles. The high effectiveness of these weapons, making it possible selectively to hit small targets, was tested in Iraq. These weapons could also be used to hit targets in Russia's strategic nuclear forces. The geostrategic situation does not allow Russia to respond in kind. Obviously the strategic arms reduction treaty should take account of this possibility and declare that strikes against targets in

the strategic nuclear forces by conventional weapons will mean the commencement of the use of nuclear weapons on our part.

Russia has declared its commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, while the United States is refraining from such a statement. The START II Treaty could be a very suitable vehicle for such a statement by both sides. Otherwise the position of the sides concluding a treaty supposedly based on parity is very far from parity.

Russia signs a treaty as important as START II without having formulated a national security concept or a military doctrine. Will this not cause problems later?

The treaty's implementation on schedule will require considerable expenditure. Is this realistic, given Russia's present situation? If we are relying on U.S. credits, they could refuse, on the grounds that we are "behaving badly." A lure of \$24 billion is already being dangled under Russia's nose, and has been for some time.

Is it expedient to destroy the military facilities that come under the START II reductions; could there be economically preferable options? Can Russia withstand such a disarmament race? No answers have been found to these and other questions. But one thing is clear: It is, to put it mildly, not very smart to pass off as parity the equality of certain numerical indicators, without a systematic quality analysis of the entire range of problems.

Lastly, the haste to sign a treaty with such important consequences is inexplicable and therefore alarming. Where are we hurrying to, and why? One can understand the former U.S. president—maybe he was in a hurry to put the final touches to his picture of the collapse of communism as a fitting end to his presidency. But the president of Russia—is he finishing something off, too?

Russian Defense Minister Defends START Treaties, Weapons Safety

LD2302163293 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1900 GMT 22 Feb 93

[Interview with Defense Minister Pavel Grachev by announcers Tatyana Krasnova and Sergey Torchinskiy, with various correspondents in the studio; from the "Without Retouching" program—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] **Grachev:** Good evening, esteemed viewers. Good evening to everyone taking part in this program. I have accepted with pleasure the invitation to take part in the "Without Retouching" program. I'd like to say that I have prepared thoroughly for this broadcast, especially for the five minutes which the presenter has kindly allocated to me. It seems to me that this is a successful form of human contact. One is in the focus of topical questions, and with these questions there isn't much of a chance to hesitate before answering these questions. [passage omitted]

Forming our Russian armed forces, we rely on the glorious martial traditions of the Russian and Soviet Army. We are trying to take all that was good in those armies. So, as you can see, we have many ideas, plenty to do, and I expect that you will have plenty of questions for me. And I'm ready to answer them. [passage omitted]

Vladimir Gavrilenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: Pavel Sergeyevich, the dominant theme of our newspaper has also always been the defense capability and the combat-readiness of the armed forces, and it continues to be so today. Naturally, to the extent that it is possible to publish, we publish, and there appears to be a mass of responses. But in recent times, the most significant event about which in general there has been much discussion is the START II Treaty. As you know, you concluded it on 3 January. At the forefront of the readers' response, so to speak, we have taken these responses upon ourselves and, you know, right up to wails about complete disarmament. What is your attitude toward this, especially as you will, after all, have to defend START in the Supreme Soviet?

Grachev: Yes, to defend....[changes thought] I am making preparations for this defense. Of course, it is difficult in three minutes to describe the START II Treaty in full. The only thing I will say is: First, before fulfilling the START II Treaty, it is necessary to fulfill the START I Treaty, which so far we have not embarked upon. The START II Treaty continues from START I. The only thing I want to stress for those who really do feel that we are allegedly disarming ourselves is that in signing the START I Treaty, some aspects really were detrimental and not to the benefit of Russia and, at that time, of the former Soviet Union—say, in the counting of nuclear munitions on the same aircraft. Under START I, an aircraft and missile carrier was counted as one combat unit, although it had, say, 16 or more nuclear bomb mountings. Under the START II Treaty, we parried this question. Now we count the number of carriers on strategic nuclear bombers.

Apart from this, we have more or less achieved a balance in land-based strategic nuclear weapons. We have silos where at present there are strategic multiple-warhead missiles being replaced by single warhead missiles. We have thus reduced to a significant degree the amount of resources allocated to equipping such silos for single warhead missiles. That's the second point.

Third, most importantly, counts have shown that the number of those nuclear munitions by the year 2000—and there are 3,000- 3,500 of them—testify to the fact that with these munitions we not only retain a nuclear shield but remain capable, if necessary, of destroying not only a probable foe but the whole planet, including ourselves.

At present, it is not necessary to speak of the balance of missiles we each have, because nuclear war is a catastrophe for the whole world. Let us turn to the Chernobyl tragedy: One nuclear reactor caused grief, not only to

Russia and Ukraine but to the Baltic states and beyond. This tragedy exists to this day. That is what I am talking about.

It is my firm intention to fulfill the START I and START II Treaties—if ratified by the Supreme Soviet, of course—and to go further, but after having included all five nuclear states in this treaty, and to strive for the complete destruction of nuclear weapons. [passage omitted]

Krasnova: Gennadiy Zhavoronkov of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI.

Zhavoronkov: Pavel Sergeyevich, from time to time we are shaken by sensational reports. It was recently stated to us that an officers assembly of Ukraine decided to disconnect their ballistic missiles from the central command panel. What is this? That is, what will happen then? Are we threatened by nuclear war from former Union states, and why does the Russian Ministry of Defense not comment on such statements which so alarm society?

Grachev: Officers assemblies are all the rage now, and some people seem to think that these assemblies will be running the armed forces in the near future. That is out of the question, and no matter who demands what, the unified command system does exist and all missile systems, including those in the Ukraine, are under that command. At the last meeting in Moscow between the two presidents, Boris Nikolayevich and Ukrainian President Kravchuk, both sides again confirmed that the nuclear missiles are under the control of Russian military and civilian experts. I believe that there are no grounds to worry that someone will remove the missiles, even less that the officers assembly will assume command of nuclear missiles. It has neither the know-how nor the competence or experience, none at all. [passage omitted]

German Aid to Ukraine Linked to START I Ratification

LD2302091193 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 23 Feb 93

[Text] German Environment Minister Klaus Toepfer has said that Ukraine must ratify the START I Treaty and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty before it is granted German economic aid. The minister spoke at a meeting in Kiev with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk. Toepfer is in Ukraine to discuss problems concerning the safety of nuclear power stations. Kravchuk informed the German minister that the Chernobyl station would be closed by the end of the year.

Reports on Russian Supreme Soviet Consideration of START II Treaty

Plan for Defense Committee Hearings

OW2302134893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1322 GMT 23 Feb 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Defense and Security Committee of the Russian Parliament has approved the plan of hearings on the START-II Treaty. According to the committee chairman Sergey Stepashin, the plan was accepted by the Deputy Speaker Nikolay Ryabov and will be discussed by the presidium on March 1.

Stepashin said the presidium debate on the matter scheduled for February 22 was postponed because of the official visit of the speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov to Finland.

On March 2 hearings will be held on the key provisions of the START-II Treaty and its links with the START-I. The findings of a group of political and legal experts who examined the document will be reported.

On March 9 the possible changes in strategies of nuclear powers will be discussed in the context of the treaty, specifically the future of the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] program.

On March 15 the parliament will compare the limitations imposed by START-II on the two sides and their effect on the structure and size of the armed forces of Russia and the United States.

On March 22 the focuss will be on the prospects of negotiations on strategic offensive armaments, medium-range weapons and nuclear non-proliferation.

The significance of the START-II Treaty for Russia's defense will be discussed on March 29.

The nuclear arms program for the term of the START-II treaty and the federal program of dismantling and utilizing nuclear arsenals till the year 2000 will be debated on April 5.

On April 12 the subject will be the verification procedures and inspections implied by the treaty.

On April 19 hearings will focuss on the contents and volume of work, financial backing and the readiness of the Russian armed forces to implement the START-II Treaty.

According to Stepashin, the date of final hearings on the political, military and economic aspects of the treaty involving the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, security and nuclear energy will be set separately.

Stepashin said that during the hearings opinions will be exchanged and joint sessions held with appropriate committees of the U.S. Congress.

Further on Issues Before Committee

*PM0103115693 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 27 Feb 93 p 2*

[Sergey Ovsienko report: "How the START II Treaty Will Be Ratified"]

[Text] The Russian Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and Security Questions has approved a plan for holding parliamentary hearings on the START II Treaty. The hearings will begin 2 March with the question of the treaty's main provisions and its connection with the START I Treaty. A week later it is proposed to hear an analysis of possible changes in the strategic concepts of the nuclear countries in connection with the conclusion of the START II Treaty, including questions of the further development of work under the SDI program.

The next question is that of the comparative analysis of limitations imposed on the sides by the START II Treaty and their effect on the necessary quantitative and qualitative changes in the existing Russian and U.S. groupings. It is planned on 22 March to discuss the prospects for further development of treaty processes in the sphere of strategic offensive arms, tactical nuclear weapons, and their nonproliferation. On 29 March it is proposed to hear questions of the significance of the START II Treaty for ensuring Russia's defense capability.

The lowering of the level of strategic offensive arms, says Colonel Vladimir Dvorkin, representative of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Central Scientific Research Institute, commenting on the START II Treaty, leads to a leveling out of the deterrent potentials of the Russian and U.S. nuclear groupings, and consequently to a strengthening of military-strategic stability. However, deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons must be linked to the limiting of the influence of such destabilizing factors as the development [razvertyvaniye] of ABM defense, the formation of coalitions of nuclear states against Russia, the possible effects of high-precision weapons on strategic facilities in the course of the nonnuclear period of hostilities, and the development of space reconnaissance.

As for economic aspects of the START II Treaty, the possibility of reequipping 90 heavy missile launch silos and converting 105 MIRVed missiles into single-warhead missiles by reducing to one the number of warheads on each of them will enable Russia to carry out arms reduction and the introduction of stationary missiles of the SS-25 type at a less intensive pace, thereby reducing costs. Moreover the need to create new manufacturing capacities in Russia and to modernize MIRVed ICBM's disappears. Preliminary analysis shows that the total savings attached to the development of Russia's strategic nuclear forces under the terms of the START II Treaty as compared with the START I Treaty could amount to 80-90 billion rubles over 10 years.

The assessment of the military-strategic equilibrium is based on comparison of the counterforce and deterrent

potential of the sides' ICBM and SLBM groupings. Under the terms of the START II Treaty Russia's counterforce potential is halved, because of the elimination of MIRVed ICBM's. At the same time the analogous potential of the U.S. strategic offensive forces is reduced by a factor of four to five. As a result the correlation between the sides' counterforce potential shifts from 3.5 to 1 (in favor of the United States) under the terms of the START I Treaty to 1.4 to 1 under the terms of the START II Treaty.

Series of Hearings Expected

*OW0103181093 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1700 GMT 1 Mar 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The issue concerning preparations for the ratification of the START-2 treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on the future reduction and restriction of strategic offensive weapons received no opposition in parliament Monday [1 March]. It was included in a number of draft laws to be submitted to parliamentary committees and commissions for discussion.

A series of parliamentary hearings on the political, strategic, administrative and economic aspects of the treaty is expected to precede the eventual ratification of the document.

Presidium Passes Treaty Without Discussion

*LD0103164993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1602 GMT 1 Mar 93*

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow March 1 TASS—The Russian Parliament Presidium sent the START-2 Treaty between the United States and Russia to committees and commissions to prepare their conclusions. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty provides for considerable cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the two powers and substantial restrictions of the arms systems of the Russian Federation.

No objections to the treaty were voiced at the Parliament Presidium meeting and the resolution on the matter was passed without discussion. Along with this, the resolution noted that "in the interests of preparing the treaty for ratification, its expert evaluation is necessary from the military-political, military-strategic, military-technical and economic viewpoints".

Expert evaluation will be held in the form of parliamentary hearings which will take place after the Defence and Security Committee and the Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations examine and summarize proposals made by their colleagues in parliament.

Parliamentary Hearings Begin

OW0203120193 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1146 GMT 2 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The first parliamentary hearings on the START-2 Treaty, signed on January 3 by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and then U.S. President George Bush, have begun in Moscow. Vice-Chairman of the Russian parliament, Nikolay Ryabov, said that the hearings will last for 2 months. He also said that the deputies will get acquainted with the military-political and military-economic aspects of the treaty and discuss the Russian Armed Forces' strategic development, as well as the terms of the START-2 Treaty.

The deputies will also draft the principles of Russia's nuclear policy and a program for the development of nuclear armaments. So far, new projects in this area are based on the programs adopted in the former Soviet Union, said Nikolay Ryabov.

On Tuesday [2 March], the deputies will be addressed by Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Chief of the Russian Armed Forces' General Staff, Mikhail Kolesnikov. They will speak about the basic provisions of the START-2 Treaty and analyze it from the political and legal points of view.

Chief of General Staff Comments

OW0203120993 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1147 GMT 2 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The START-2 Treaty meets both Russia's interests and international security standards, Chief of the Russian Armed Forces' General Staff, Mikhail Kolesnikov, said during the parliamentary hearings on the ratification of the START-2 Treaty.

Kolesnikov also noted that one could not assess that document from the point of view of "mere arithmetic." Today, nuclear armaments can only be viewed as weapons of deterrence, not as weapons of war, he added.

In his opinion, the START-2 Treaty will, first, make such deterrence efficient, and second, change the world attitude towards Russia's nuclear potential, which no longer poses any threat to the world, but is an element in the universal security system.

Kolesnikov pointed out that Russia's military doctrine which is being drafted at the moment, reflects the general tendency to cut down nuclear armaments. At the same time, he expressed serious concern about the fact that the more than 1000 nuclear warheads, still kept in Ukraine, are practically unmonitored, and that in view of this, radiation is a thousand times higher than the admissible level.

Speaking about Ukraine's position on the START-2 Treaty, Kolesnikov said that "Ukrainian politicians must understand that the course they have chosen will lead them to a dead end, and that they may become political outcasts.

Next November, the Russian armed forces will be confronted with serious problems connected with the forthcoming drafting campaign, said Kolesnikov. "We are moving towards catastrophe," he said. "Our borders will be unprotected because there is no one to replace the soldiers who have ended their service," he added.

Kozyrev Addresses Committee Hearing

LD0203133093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1302 GMT 2 Mar 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow March 2 TASS—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev called on members of the Russian parliament to ratify the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-2) between Russia and the United States, when he addressed the parliamentary hearings organised by the commissions for defence and foreign policy of the parliament today.

According to the minister, without ratifying the START-2 Treaty, Russia would return to confrontation with the entire world and the psychology of a besieged fortress.

Touching on Ukraine's attitude to the nuclear arms cuts, Andrey Kozyrev noted that the position of influential circles in Kiev both with regard to the START-1 and START-2 Treaties remains equivocal. This, according to the minister, caused apprehension both in Russia and in its partner countries. Ukraine is taking steps aimed at establishing control of the nuclear arms deployed on its territory. Kozyrev said Ukraine was seeking to keep these arms as long as possible.

"Kiev must understand that this policy can bring about more losses than illusory dividends", Kozyrev said. He expressed hope that the ratification of the START-2 Treaty by the Russian parliament would provide a positive impetus to Ukraine which would then ratify the START-1 Treaty.

Kozyrev on 'Nuclear Capitulation'

OW0203152493 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1453 GMT 2 Mar 93

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Andrey Borodin, Dmitriy Voskoboinikov and Igor Porshnev; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] There exists only one alternative to the START-2 treaty—"unilateral nuclear capitulation" by Russia or a return to a policy of confrontation with the United States, which would be "beyond our strength." The

statement was made by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev on Tuesday [2 March] at open parliamentary hearings on the START-2 treaty. He emphasized that the treaty not only "takes us out of the arms race, but also does not plunge us into a disarmament race."

The minister said that the treaty takes the economic interests of Russia into complete account, allows the establishment of a new level of strategic stability, and offers the opportunity to reform Russia's strategic nuclear forces.

In addition, noted Kozyrev, START-2 puts an end to "the nuclear ambitions of various states, and encourages their joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." "To refuse START-2 would mean calling START-1 into doubt," emphasized the minister.

In his opinion, even if START-2 is not signed, Russia would undertake a unilateral reduction of its nuclear armaments, since in the last years of its existence, the former USSR was obviously in no condition to sustain the arms race.

In Kozyrev's view, "to give up START-2 would also mean to resume confrontation with the entire world and return to the besieged fortress psychology."

However, START-2 is not the price Russia has to pay for its cooperation with the USA. The treaty reflects the new spirit of partnership between the two countries and if it is not ratified the situation can only worsen. If this happens, Kozyrev said, certain forces in the USA might start encouraging such "mythical countries" as Ukraine to get hold of nuclear weapons.

Kozyrev explained that the reason why the START-2 treaty was drawn up and signed so quickly is due to the fact that the volume of technical work was cut by 90%, since START-2 is 90% based on the START-1 treaty.

According to the foreign minister, essentially there is no alternative concept to the START-2 treaty, except open confrontation. As far as the confrontational concept is concerned, it proceeds from the assumption that a nuclear conflict between Russia and the USA, based on the principle "who beats whom" and "who launches the first strike," is inevitable.

This concept is "inertia of the past," "a conceptual trap" we got caught in during the arms race, Kozyrev said. "This logic is unacceptable now," he stressed.

According to the foreign minister, one of the foremost tasks now is to strengthen the nuclear arms non-proliferation regime. Nuclear weapons, he pointed out, can be acquired primarily by countries situated not far from Russia's southern borders, the area that harbors the greatest danger of all kinds of ethnic conflicts to Russia.

Kozyrev paid particular attention to the stance taken by Ukraine, the only republic that has not ratified the START-1 treaty to this day. According to him, "the

attitude of influential circles in Kiev to START-1 and to START-2 continues to be ambiguous." It makes Russia and its partners concerned, he stressed.

According to Kozyrev, Kiev is taking steps that are actually aimed at establishing control over nuclear weapons deployed on Ukrainian soil. The reason for this is to keep these weapons in Ukraine as long as possible. In this connection Russia's foreign minister pointed out that as a result of such policy Ukraine might sustain great losses rather than derive "some illusory dividends." If Russia's Parliament ratifies START-2, this will serve as an incentive for Ukraine to strictly comply with the START-1 provisions, he said.

Opening the hearings, Deputy Speaker Nikolay Ryabov said they will continue for at least two months, and the legislators will be gathering at least once every two weeks.

According to Ryabov, "the concrete foundations of our nuclear policy are virtually nonexistent." Therefore, the deputy speaker said, it's expedient to consider not only the issues connected with the ratification of the START-2 treaty, but also define the basic parameters of Russia's nuclear policy, so that they could be reviewed by the Parliament later.

Opposition Leader Reacts

OW0203175493 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1639 GMT 2 Mar 93

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] If the START-2 Treaty is implemented, the United States will become 36 times more powerful militarily than Russia. This was stated at parliamentary hearings in the Russian House of Councils by retired Lieutenant-General Boris Tarasov, leader of the Fatherland oppositional faction. Voicing his opposition to the Supreme Soviet's ratification of the treaty, he stressed that implementing START-2 would cost "tens of trillions of rubles."

Nikolay Pavlov, one of the leaders of the Russian Unity oppositional bloc, said the Russian Foreign Ministry's doctrine on START-2 was "utopian" and claimed that the country's higher military leadership, which today supports this doctrine, "will be kicking themselves in a few years." Pavlov said that the nuclear arms reductions which START-2 stipulates "will cause rebellion among Russian troops."

Andrey Golovin, a leader of the "Change - New Policy" faction, said that START-2 "is primarily beneficial to the USA and does not correspond to Russia's interests." He feels that if the treaty is implemented, in 10 years parity in the military sector will be lost, and Russia will become dependent on the United States.

More on Hearings

*PM0303120793 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 3 Mar 93 p 1*

[Vladimir Yermolin report: "Hearings on START II Held at Russian Federation Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] These are not the first hearings on the START II Treaty. As people will know, the treaty submitted for ratification has had a far from unanimous reception from deputies and has generated considerable discussion among not just professional military men but politicians too. Today's hearings proceeded in the same vein as the preceding ones. The position of the Foreign Ministry (Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev) and the Defense Ministry (Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the Russian Federation Joint Armed Forces General Staff) was presented on the one hand, while on the other, in the role of opponents, there was Iona Andronov, deputy chairman of the parliamentary Committee for International Affairs, the "Russian Unity" parliamentary bloc, and the "Change-New Policy" faction.

Nikolay Ryabov, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, who chaired the first half of the hearings, noted in his opening remarks that the present-day stage possesses a number of features which have to be taken account of in assessing START II. First, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons runs out in 1995. In these conditions all five nuclear powers must adopt uniform stances. Second, analysis shows a quantitative increase in nuclear armaments in countries which are not bound by treaty limitations (500-600 strategic nuclear warheads by the year 2000). That is to say, the sooner everyone sits down at the negotiating table, the better. Ryabov stressed that the example of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus shows that it is far more difficult for five powers to reach agreement than two. The third feature resides in our internal problems in elaborating a validated nuclear policy and Russian nuclear arms program. Therefore, in Ryabov's opinion, during the process of the hearings on the START II Treaty it is advisable not only to examine the questions of its ratification but also to determine the basic provisions of Russian Federation nuclear policy and submit them to the Supreme Soviet.

The hearings have shown that critics of the treaty are most put out by what they see as a lack of guarantees that the United States is altering its military doctrine toward Russia as the legal successor to the USSR. Nikolay Ryabov asked the foreign minister to prepare an appropriate information report providing documentary corroboration of positive changes in U.S. military policy toward Russia and similar processes within NATO. Clearly, we are talking about a kind of list of specific steps which show that no one is intending to talk to Russia from a position of strength.

**Ukrainian President Comments on START I,
Missile Safety Issues****Interview With Hungarian Paper**

*AU0203162393 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET
in Hungarian 26 Feb 93 p 7*

[Interview with President Leonid Kravchuk by MAGYAR NEMZET Deputy Chief Editor Jozsef Martin and Moscow correspondent Laszlo Vida, in Kiev; date not given: "Ukraine Wants To Settle Its Differences of Views With Russia Peacefully"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] **MAGYAR NEMZET:** After the United States and Russia, Ukraine is the third nuclear power at the moment. Kiev has already declared its intention to get rid of the nuclear weapons. However, the ratification of the START I agreement is delayed. How do you explain this?

Kravchuk: This is the task of the Parliament. I submitted START I and the nuclear ban agreement to Parliament more than 2 months ago. The documents are being studied now. We are conducting broad consultations with countries that could provide financial and organizational assistance. I think the ratification will take place; the only question is when. I do not think that the Supreme Council is dragging its feet deliberately.

MAGYAR NEMZET: When do you think Ukraine will ratify the agreement?

Kravchuk: The issue is on the agenda of the current session of the Supreme Council.

MAGYAR NEMZET: Doubts have been expressed about the technical servicing and safety of the nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine. Do we have reasons to be alarmed?

Kravchuk: During my latest talks in Moscow, we agreed that Russia would provide assistance in servicing the missiles deployed here. We must come to an agreement with the Russians because they brought these weapons systems here. However, ratification is the most important thing now, and a lot of questions will arise after this ratification. The elimination of such a number of missiles hardly costs less than their construction, and all this under circumstances of serious economic crisis, when we should increase our social expenses. [passage omitted]

Interview With German Magazine

*AU0203084593 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
1 Mar 93 pp 151-153*

[Interview with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk by Martina Melmerich and Olaf Ihlau in Kravchuk's office in Kiev; date not given: "Freedom Is Freedom"]

[Excerpts] **DER SPIEGEL:** Mr. President, you said at one time that existing side by side with Russia is like sharing a bed with an elephant. Is Ukraine now being crushed by this elephant?

Kravchuk: That was actually meant to express our respect for Russia. I intended to stress its power.

DER SPIEGEL: And thus also the danger that may emanate from Russia?

Kravchuk: Of course. When such a great state carries out abrupt changes—in politics, in the economic sector, or in border affairs—we feel it immediately. [passage omitted]

DER SPIEGEL: There is also a dispute with Moscow over the 176 intercontinental missiles based in Ukraine. Is it true that you do not receive the necessary technical assistance from Russia to maintain and protect those weapons?

Kravchuk: We believe that Russia too has an interest in seeing these missiles safe.

DER SPIEGEL: But the Moscow IZVESTIYA sees in the Ukrainian missile silos the "danger of another Chernobyl," and safety tests are allegedly no longer carried out regularly at 16 missile launching bases where increased doses of radioactivity have reportedly been noted.

Kravchuk: That is not true, these are rumors. I have detailed information from the Defense Ministry, saying that all silos are safe and under control. Russia is giving technical aid and will continue to do so. There is just one problem that has not been correctly described. Russia says: The missile bases on Ukrainian territory are Russian property. According to this, Russia would maintain its own missiles in our country.

DER SPIEGEL: Of course you do not agree.

Kravchuk: We do not claim operational missiles. But we want to have the components of the missiles once they are disassembled.

DER SPIEGEL: What for?

Kravchuk: That is a matter of principle. If we claimed the operational missiles, we would promptly be considered one of the nuclear powers. We reject that, however.

DER SPIEGEL: Do you intend to sell the devilish nuclear stuff to the highest bidder?

Kravchuk: No. We want to reuse the uranium in our nuclear power plants. It is manufactured into fuel rods in Russia and we then use it.

DER SPIEGEL: Your national democratic opposition would prefer to keep the nuclear weapons—as a deterrent against any territorial claims by Russia.

Kravchuk: That is a certain group to which some sections of the opposition and other deputies belong. There are not very many of them.

DER SPIEGEL: In western Ukraine, 50 percent of the people would allegedly like to see their country continue as an atomic power.

Kravchuk: I do not know of such opinion polls; by the way, the START I disarmament treaty will be ratified by parliament, not by the people.

DER SPIEGEL: But there is apparently opposition in this parliament to the ratification of the START I agreement. The deputies demand security guarantees of the nuclear powers and financial compensation first.

Kravchuk: There are such deputies. But we will solve the problem of the security guarantees. There are already agreements with the United States, Russia, Great Britain, and we are also discussing the problem with France.

DER SPIEGEL: Are your missiles perhaps a pawn for the desirable billions from the West?

Kravchuk: We need money for the destruction of our nuclear weapons. I held talks with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development on the creation of a fund to finance the scrapping of the missiles. The destruction of such weapons costs a lot of money. Ukraine is currently experiencing a serious economic crisis. If we were to use our whole budget now for scrapping the missiles, our people would not understand that. So we need help.

DER SPIEGEL: Reportedly you want \$2.5 billion.

Kravchuk: I do not know of this figure. The most important thing is to destroy the missiles. There are no exact cost estimates. When we have eliminated the first missile base, it will be clear what it costs.

DER SPIEGEL: But if you were to remain a nuclear power, the whole nuclear disarmament program would be obstructed. Moscow has already said that in such a case, it could not accept a further reduction in its strategic nuclear weapons, as agreed upon with the United States in the START II treaty.

Kravchuk: Our parliament is aware of its responsibility. Ukraine will not obstruct disarmament and the destruction of nuclear weapons. We must see one thing: Ukraine did not build the missiles on its territory, but it is now responsible for their destruction. That is a legacy of the Soviet Union, which we must deal with, and Ukraine cannot do so alone.

DER SPIEGEL: When will START I be ratified?

Kravchuk: It is already on the agenda for the next parliamentary sessions. [passage omitted]

DER SPIEGEL: When are you going to sign the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons?

Kravchuk: Our parliament will simultaneously decide on the START agreement and the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. I introduced both documents in parliament in November last year. [passage omitted]

Moscow To Launch Start-1 Missile Carriers
OW0203190493 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1822 GMT 2 Mar 93

[From the "Interfax Business Report" feature; following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia will conduct the first launch March 25 of new "Start-1" missile carriers, created on the basis of the CC-20 and CC-25 ballistic missile mobile complex, and able to launch 550 kg of payload into orbit to altitudes of 700 km.

The missile, which Motorola, one of the largest American communications companies has expressed interest in, is designed to launch satellites into low orbits for government organizations and commercial structures to establish satellite communications systems, distance probing, and ecological control.

The "Start-1" missile carrier, to be launched from the Plesetsk (northern Russia) aerospace field will carry an experimental communications satellite developed by the Russian stock company IBK and the Kompleks scientific center.

Russian military aerospace forces, which launch all rockets in Russia, will put 5 satellites into orbit in March from the Plesetsk and Baykonur (Kazakhstan) aerospace fields.

U.S. Nuclear Program Viewed in Wake of Arms Cuts

93WC0026B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 20 Feb 93 p 9

[Article by Vladimir Gubarev: "Will the Americans Reciprocate?"]

[Text] At the present time, much is being written and said about nuclear disarmament. As far as we know, Russia has dramatically cut the financing of this kind of armament. The press reported that our nuclear physicists have not been paid their wages for several months. But how are things in America? Is the United States really spending less money on nuclear weapons now?—Kachanov family, Moscow

In the United States, a significant reduction of the nuclear potential is planned, as is foreseen in the agreements between the two countries. In the 1993 fiscal year, \$9.5 billion is requested for the military nuclear program, which is 9 percent less than in the previous year. In particular, they have ceased production of weapons-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Since

nuclear warheads are being dismantled, American scientists are now paying especially close attention to the reuse of plutonium components of nuclear warheads. For this purpose, they are planning to carry out additional underground tests. So the problem of the prohibition of all weapons tests obviously will not be resolved until scientists conclude these investigations. In general, \$1.9 billion is being allocated this year to the study, development, and testing of nuclear weapons, whereas \$3.6 billion is being spent on the production of the weapons.

In the United States, particular attention is being paid to the program for the clean-up of enterprises and complexes producing weapons. Broad cooperation with Russia is planned in this area.

In the United States, three scientific research laboratories are creating new models of weapons. They are analogous to our "Arzamas-16" and "Chelyabinsk-70." Their financing is being maintained at the previous level, so that their scientists and designers are not threatened with unemployment.

As you know, U.S. specialists are especially interested in some of Russia's nuclear materials. There are a number of technologies that permit us to work more efficiently and reliably. Naturally the Americans would like to obtain them. They are hoping that the difficult economic situation in Russia will force us to make a number of concessions, in particular in the sale of weapons-grade uranium, which will make it possible to mothball several "dirty" production sites in the United States.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

U.S. Said Developing ABM Lasers

93WC0026A ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
20 Feb 93 p 6

[Unattributed Article: "Lasers Against Ballistic Missiles"]

[Text] Researchers in the United States are studying the possibility of beginning work on projects whose realization may lead to the deployment of a high-power laser weapon on board aircraft for use in tactical ABM systems in theaters of military operations.

Wide-fuselage aircraft of the "Boeing-747" type are being considered as delivery systems for high-energy chemical lasers, whereas small military aircraft and remotely piloted vehicles are being studied as delivery systems for compact solid-state lasers.

The work is being performed at Livermore National Laboratory under the "Defender" project, in the scope of which it is proposed to create a laser weapon capable of destroying ballistic missiles in the vertical flight phase of their trajectory at a range of 100-150 km. At the present time, the laboratory has a small-scale solid-state laser on

glass with an admixture of neodim with a length of the emission wave of 1.06 micrometer and a power output of 1 kilowatt.

American specialists hope to raise the power of such lasers to several megawatts, utilizing the experience of Moscow scientists from the "Astrophysics" association, in particular through the technology for the transformation of the wave front guaranteeing limited diffractions and consequently a high quality of the laser beam.

INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

CIS, U.S. Officials Discuss INF Verification

LD2602193193 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1700 GMT 26 Feb 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] A sitting of the joint consultative commission on disarmament issues has ended at the headquarters of the CIS working group in Minsk. In addition to consultations on the practical implementation by CIS states of the treaty on antimissile defense, over the past 3 days military experts from Commonwealth countries have been holding talks with a U.S. delegation on verification [kontrol] within the framework of the Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-range Missiles [INF].

[K. Grishchenko, Ukrainian representative] The treaty was physically implemented several years ago, and the missiles were eliminated. At the same time, there remain a number of clauses in the treaty which are being implemented now by a number of states, and that includes those clauses concerning inspection activity. We are discussing how this should be carried out—in what format and in what conditions.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Lithuania Makes Plans for Former Soviet Military Base

934K0324B Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian
12-19 Feb 93 p 5

[Article by J. Pekarskaite under the rubric "Passions of Mars": "Rukla Has Not Yet Been Plundered. Yet..."]

[Text] A group of officials from the Ministry of Defense, headed by Deputy Chief of the Organizational Branch of the Military-Administrative Department A. Butautas, visited the military unit stationed in Rukla. An authorized representative of the government on issues of the withdrawal of the Russian Army from Lithuania, Colonel S. Knezys, had inspected Rukla a little earlier, and admitted that he had not realized the military base was so large. The Ministry of Defense plans to accommodate one battalion numbering roughly 500 men in Rukla.

The military unit should leave before August 31, says A. Butautas, in accordance with the timetable for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania; that is essentially the last deadline, since according to the agreements the withdrawal of the former Soviet Army should be completely finished by that date. Reinforcements arrived at Rukla several weeks ago, however. An aircraft carrying soldiers landed at the Kedainiai airfield, 400 of whom were sent to Rukla by truck. This was able to be established by the Jonava Rayon commandant's office and the defense service. Armed fighters from the Ministry of Defense, relates Jonava Rayon commandant Lieutenant V. Jakutis, last night took up positions on both sides of the highway behind the bridge through Neris, while the police were stopping all passing vehicles. There are residential houses not far away. The military column fortunately halted, and 400 soldiers were delivered to Rukla by midnight. Division commander Colonel V. Yevtukhovich commented on this incident that "We asked for permission for 2,000 soldiers to arrive so that they could help us leave, and only 400 came. And now a big scandal has been raised, even though there was agreement at all levels." At just what levels, the colonel did not elaborate.

The group of officials from the Ministry of Defense came in order to become acquainted with the military facility, although the Russian military for some reason doubted that. "Your expedition is of a peculiar nature," Colonel V. Yevtukhovich emphasized several times, pointing at the journalists' recorders. To the question of just what he had in mind, he answered that the military have their dignity, and there is no need to mock them...

The main reason, said the commander of the division, that the guests were greeted so ungraciously was the fact that there is still quite a bit of time until the withdrawal of the unit, and the military are prepared to give an account only over the two months preceding August 31 ("The time will come, and we will open all of the doors and windows"). The colonel said not to rush events along, and then added, "Neither we nor you doubt that we will be leaving this year."

By the way, a little later he cited a second reason that had foregone sitting at his desk and engaging in "office work," i.e. discussing all the details: "the time for attacks has passed," he said, and he had heard about the visit of such a large delegation only an hour ago. No one could answer why it had not been reported sooner. A. Butautas elaborated that he had received the directive to leave for Rukla the night before, and the commandant of Jonava could get in touch with the unit only in the morning.

After long arguments, persuasion and even the suggestion to "take a plane or helicopter and fly around over Rukla," the unit commander promised to prepare a detailed plan of the housing area and a general one of the military facilities in a week or two, as well as giving permission to drive around the military base. An overall

view and an overall plan, in his words, would be sufficient to decide how this or that structure could be used. The general plan for Rukla, in the words of the colonel, is a military secret.

V. Yevtukhovich stated that apartments were promised as compensation for the military facilities at the start of negotiations. Now another policy has come along, and they are proposing in friendly fashion the condition that we let them have 40 percent of the military vehicles, and everything will be fine. "What do you, such a small nation, need an army for?" asked the colonel. "Perhaps to reduce unemployment..." The officials of the Ministry of Defense were silent.

The "tour guide" on the grounds of the military unit, Deputy Division Commander A. Gladyshev, said, "The army is politics, and both you and we are suffering economically." The military are not set up all that badly there in Rukla, but the future is unclear. The unit where they will be transferred is no worse, but there are no apartments. A military person passing by intervened in the discussion and declared that they were also people, but embittered and deceived.

Traces of the coming collapse were evident here and there. There were no windows or doors on the inoperative bathhouse. Several garages had been dismantled. And although the first deputy division commander assured us that the chimneys of little stoves were sticking out the windows because the apartments were poorly heated, there is another version as well: that they are simply taking the cast-iron radiators out of the buildings.

It is well known from bitter experience that if one does not take immediate steps right now, this base will also be plundered, as has already happened in Lithuania. In the words of the deputy manager of Jonava Rayon, E. Sinkevicius, when Rukla opens its gates they will have to lease the buildings for 3-5 years immediately, possibly without competition, since to wait for a decision on privatization would mean to be left without the buildings.

But Rukla is essentially a second Jonava. There is a school, a kindergarten, a polyclinic, stores, post office, cultural hall, hotel, officers' quarters, cafeterias, residential apartments, garages, storage facilities, three boilers adapted to operate using various fuels, and even a newspaper office and cable television. Three apartments in the military base are entirely autonomous, and even enclosed by a fence. One even has its own subsidiary plot. We will hardly be able to look at it. There are, on the other hand, no impediments here (naturally, for a certain fee) to the enterprising people who are freely trucking whatever they want in and out of Rukla.

What will be left after them?

St Petersburg Center To Dismantle Tanks, Produce Tractors

*PM1902140893 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1500 GMT 18 Feb 93*

[“Novosti” newscast video report from St. Petersburg by Vladimir Batalov]

[Text] [Batalov to camera, in front of row of tanks in the snow] One of the oldest plants is seeing its defense function gradually become a thing of the past. Tanks have been repaired here for several decades, from the legendary “34” to the present day. Now the plant has been turned into the first Russian center for scrapping combat vehicles.

Under the international treaty—it has been signed by over 20 countries—some 30 tanks are to be scrapped in the European part of Russia.

The first 60 combat vehicles scheduled for destruction were shown to foreign observers from Britain, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and France. The T-55 and T-62 tanks scheduled for destruction are scandalously obsolete but nevertheless before the blow torch touched the metal the engines and optical instruments were dismantled and the caterpillar tracks were removed—they will find a use in the national economy.

At the very old armored vehicle and tank plant, repair of present-day combat vehicles will continue as before and alongside them the defense industry workers are to produce caterpillar tractors, skidding tractors, and power units. They have to make a living, after all.

Reports, Comments on Russian Troop Withdrawal From Latvia

Manpower Shrinks to 27,000

934K0145B Riga DIENA in Latvian 12 Jan 93 pp 1, 8

[Article by Janis Silis: “Russian Army’s Contingent Shrinks to 27,000”]

[Text] The numerical composition of the Russian military contingent stationed on Latvian territory has decreased by about 40 percent since the beginning of the withdrawal. This data was submitted by the commander of the Northwestern Group of Forces and has been corroborated by the Latvian Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of Defense has calculated that as of 1 Jan this year, 681 Russian military units with about 27,000 servicemen remain. (According to earlier reports from various sources, the number of military personal in Latvia was originally 60,000-120,000.)

Units of the ground forces, navy, air force, and air-defense forces of the Russian army currently occupy 70,000 hectares of Latvian territory. The Latvian Foreign Ministry prepared this information based on the

observations of local inhabitants and employees of rayon civil service administrations.

According to the ministry's information bulletin, the Russian armed forces have at their disposal 29 tanks, 73 AFVs and APCs, 12 anti-aircraft weapons systems, 36 self-propelled howitzers of various calibres, over 2,500 vehicles, 30 fighter-bombers, 20 tactical bombers, 11 transport aircraft, 11 helicopters, 12 submarines, 29 warships of various types, and about 100 auxiliary vessels.

The Defense Ministry reports that the 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade was illegally formed this year, and that the NWGF Command has been unable to convincingly argue the need for it. It is stationed in the immediate vicinity of Riga, at Adazi and Dobeles (18 and 70 kilometers, resp, from Riga). It consists of three tank battalions, two motorized rifle battalions, three artillery battalions, and other subunits. The Defense Ministry believes that this, coupled with the concentration of armed forces in Riga, in the Riga rayon, Liepaja, and Daugavpils, destabilizes the political situation and poses a constant threat to Latvia's independence.

The Ministry reports that the intelligence and counter-intelligence services of the Russian security service and military (over twenty units in all) continue their activities.

Nevertheless, the Russian army is gradually leaving Latvia, although violations of the procedures for withdrawal established in the 1 Feb 1992 communique signed by the delegations of the Latvian and Russian governments occur regularly. Thus, during the second half of last year, the Russian army withdrew from 90 installations occupied by the military. Thirty-three military units have left Latvian territory. "In addition, 50 military units have been disbanded and 15 have illegally been sold to commercial entities," states the bulletin. Last year there were 54 confirmed instances of Russian replacement troops entering illegally (2630 soldiers), as well as hundreds of other violations of various kinds. Mercenaries are recruited into Russian military units from among residents of Latvia.

In a meeting with representatives of the Kuldiga rayon municipal government, the head of the Bureau for Oversight of Russian Troop Withdrawal, Ilgonis Upmalis, noted there being reports that this year, Russian troop withdrawal could take place on a much greater scale. From the Russian point of view, the deadline for troop withdrawal might be 1994; the Latvian position is September 1993. Nevertheless, as Upmalis notes, there are certain installations that could not be withdrawn this year even with the best of intentions. These would be army munitions storage facilities.

Today, representatives of the Latvian delegation for international talks and the Kuldiga rayon municipal government discussed how to resolve the sore point over the closure of the Skrunda radar site. According to the information that the rayon municipal government has, the Russians could supposedly set up a new kind of mobile station based on a new principal on their own territory within six months.

Agency Head Calls For Schedule

*OW2002170293 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1608 GMT 20 Feb 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The chief of a Latvian agency which monitors the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Latvian territory, Ilgonis Upmalis, sees the absence of a schedule for the Russian pullout as the main obstacle for the pullout as such.

He says the legal status of the Russian servicemen will remain unclear as long as there is no deadline for their presence.

Owing to the same reason, says Ilgonis Upmalis, the Russian servicemen cannot enjoy a preferential legal standing in Latvia and more conflicts with law will be bound to happen.

Latvian Officials Meet Russian Army Reform Group

*LD1802232493 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1800 GMT 18 Feb 93*

[Text] The issue of the withdrawal of the Russian Army contingent from Latvia is unequivocal, representatives of the army reform group from a commission of Russian people's deputies stressed today at a meeting with deputies of the Latvian parliament, Foreign Ministry representatives, and counsellors on defense matters to the prime minister and the minister of state.

The withdrawal, however, should proceed in a civilized manner so that it will neither break the fortunes of those people who are being withdrawn nor create inhuman living conditions for the servicemen and families who will remain for the time being. The representatives of the army reform group believe that in comparison with Lithuania and Estonia, the situation in Latvia is the most difficult one. This is evidenced by many complaints by Russian officers.

During the talk the illegality of several Russian constitutional standards was pointed out to the Russian side, since it is not permissible for the army of a foreign state to be active in some other state.

Army Reform Agrees on Need To Withdraw*OW1902131893 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1204 GMT 19 Feb 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] There can be no doubt as to the need to withdraw Russia's military contingent from Latvia, said spokesmen for the Russian parliamentary group "Army Reform".

In Riga on Thursday [18 February] their delegation conferred with Latvian MPs [Members of Parliament], Foreign Ministry officials, and defence advisers to Latvia's prime minister and minister of state. The withdrawal of troops, they said, should be carried out "in a civilized manner", without poisoning life for the people who are to leave Latvia, without creating "inhuman conditions" for the servicemen and their families remaining in Latvia for the time being.

Spokesmen for the Army Reform group believe that, as compared with Lithuania and Estonia, the situation in Latvia is the most complicated. The numerous complaints of Russian army officers testify to this.

The Army Reform group in Russia's parliament is relatively small (164 persons). It was formed only two months ago. Nevertheless its spokesmen hope that, as a result of their present visit, the Russian Parliament and Government will heed their advice.

Members of the delegation also conferred with the command of the North-Western Group of Russian troops and with war veterans, and visited several Russian military units.

Latvian Colonel: Withdrawal on Schedule*OW0203185893 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1728 GMT 2 Mar 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia is, Baltfax was informed by Colonel Stasys Knezys, responsible in the Latvian government for matters connected with the withdrawal, taking place according to schedule. However some deviations remained, he said.

The colonel said that 70 of the 95 Russian units in Latvia at the time the schedule for their withdrawal was agreed on September 8, 1992, had been withdrawn by March 1. 12,600 of the 22,000 servicemen were still on the republic's territory.

Knezys said that the withdrawal of some units had been postponed by between one and even three months, although other units had been removed ahead of schedule. The biggest delays were with air force units which had been due to leave the republic by December 31, but will now not leave before May.

Reports on Belarusian Implementation of CFE**Tanks Dismantled at Borisov***LD2202235393 Minsk Radiostantsiya Belarus
International Service in Belarusian
1900 GMT 22 Feb 93*

[Text] As we have reported, destruction of military machines, in particular tanks, has started at the Borisov plant for repairs of military machinery, in line with international agreement. They are closely lined on the parade ground awaiting their turn to be dismantled. In a special shop, they are skillfully undressed, the turret and the gun are dismantled, and the body is broken up. After foreign specialists from the United States, Germany, Italy and other western countries are convinced that everything has been done properly, the remains of the tank can be sent for smelting. In a month it is planned to turn 24 machines into metal. In 3 years, 1,657 tanks and 1,087 armoured vehicles will end their life.

Permission has been given to re-equip part of what is intended for destruction for the needs of the national economy. This is how Alesya has come to life—the machine which runs fast, swims and does not sink in marshes, is equipped with electric and gas welding and a jib crane and can lift half a tonne.

Brest Tank Division Eliminated*OW0303142093 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1358 GMT 3 Mar 93*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In accordance with the decisions of the Belarusian government and parliament on the reduction of armed forces, on Wednesday [3 March] the last train with military equipment assigned to the 76th tank division left the town of Brest. Consequently, the division ceased to exist as a combat unit.

Deputy division commander Gennadiy Gonchar reported that military equipment will be cut at one of the Belarusian tank repair factories. According to the obligations, the republic should remove and destroy about 1,500 tanks.

Estonian-Russian Discussions on Troop Strength*WS0203150093 Tallinn BNS in English
2259 GMT 1 Mar 93*

[Text] Tallinn, March 01, BNS—Some 5,900 Russian soldiers are still stationed in Estonia, Admiral Yuriy Belov said in a meeting today with Estonian President Lennart Meri.

The figure is decidedly less than earlier Estonian estimates. Estonian officials had said they thought the numbers reached as high as 9,000 soldiers.

The president also received the commander in chief of the Baltic navy, Vladimir Yegorov.

Admiral Yegorov promised to make every effort to accelerate the withdrawal of the Russian navy from Estonia. The two biggest problems are building living quarters for the military who leave Estonia and the ammunition removal, he said.

Meri said he was concerned about the oil pollution in the Paldiski harbour.

"Estonia feels the pulse of Russia and wishes that the development of Russia should not influence the situation in Estonia," Meri said at the meeting.

At the same time Meri happily accepted the Russian President's Boris Yeltsin's congratulations on the 75th anniversary of the Republic of Estonia. "Estonia will further on be interested in wide contacts with Russia," Meri said. Meri forwarded Estonia's support to the democratic forces in Russia through admiral Yegorov.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Details on Fate of Participants in Russian Nuclear Tests

93WC0022A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 5 Feb 93 p 4

[Article by S. Smirnov: "They Grew Delicious Watermelons in Nuclear Fields... Major Arkhipov Complied with the Statement on Nondisclosure for 30 Years. Now the Time Has Expired"]

[Text] Chelyabinsk—They were ordered to lie face down. After a certain time the prearranged signal was heard: "The ice is breaking!" The sun that flashed in the heavens could have melted an iceberg. They knew how dangerous its rays were—they were looking through the parapet.

Forty-six participants of the Totskiy exercises, during which an atom bomb was exploded near military units of the Soviet Army, now live in the oblast. The Chelyabinsk section of the All-Russian Committee of Veterans of Special Risk Subunits has succeeded in finding a further 150 persons who went through service on the Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya nuclear test ranges. This is not very many—in the fall of 1959 and spring of 1960 alone 900 draftees were sent to the Semipalatinsk test range.

An order is a sacred duty: If they say, die—you die! But a soldier could only guess at the degree of risk. KGB Major Semen Arkhipov knew everything. The signed statement on not divulging a state secret compelled him to remain silent for 30 years. When the first articles began to appear in the press on nuclear weapons testing he complied with the taboo—the period had not expired. He collected newspaper clippings. In one article, a pilot shared his reminiscences about how, together with a security officer, he flew over the area of a nuclear device that was prepared for detonation.

The pilot knew the direction—the water tower, and that is all! But only an idiot could erect this tower in an empty steppe: A nuclear device was set up on the tower—"the barrel." The aircraft made a circle, the major took a radiation reading, and the pilot flew a return course. At the airfield the pilot said sarcastically: "Well, security officer, did you get air sick?" Arkhipov could not contain himself: "If you knew where you were flying, you most likely would have filled your pants..."

There was a reason. And not just once! Semen Pavlovich encountered unusual situations during his service. On 7 August 1972 an operational-tactical missile with a nuclear warhead was being tested on the test range. According to calculations, the missile was to explode in the air 13 kilometers from the command post. But the explosion thundered on the ground, a lethal cloud rose into the sky and headed in the direction of the command post. Soldiers and equipment stood in positions three miles behind. It was impossible to warn them immediately—during tests, all telephone conversations were forbidden. The major was not a long-distance runner, but he did well in outrunning the radioactive cloud. For which he earned...the gratitude of the chairman of the USSR KGB.

Another time, an emergency situation occurred during underground tests. So many tunnels were dug on the test range that they probably would have been enough for dozens of metros. Four persons were wheeling a bomb on rails, and there were two guards behind them. The operations officer, of course, was next to them.

The date was 8 March. The command for the explosion, which was sent by telephone, was rhymed in verse. Arkhipov remembers the rhymes, but I will not repeat them. Very frivolous rhymes. The ground moved in waves, and a stone weighing 10-20 tonnes rolled past the command post. The hill that was piled on top of the blast site settled at ground level. The cap on the tunnel entrance was blown out. Radioactive steam and gases escaped into the open air.

I asked Semen Pavlovich: "How many doses did you get?" He does not know. He made an inquiry at the archives and received the following answer: "The doses were not recorded, because of imperfections in the instruments, and also because of secrecy." People were not spared at that time, and it is necessary to assume that they were fully exposed to radiation. The certificate issued to Vladimir Petrovich Dyakonov, who served in facilities of the production association Mayak (the filling for atom bombs was prepared here), states that he received 50 rem! Arkhipov, apparently, also received a lot, for 17 "lemons" exploded over his head! (Moreover, participation in 13 underground explosions should be added to this.)

A "lemon" is what the fire ball was called which appeared in the sky as a result of an atomic explosion in the atmosphere. "These 'lemons' smelled of death," recounts Semen Pavlovich. "To this day, I do not

understand why I am still alive—there was no means of protection!" Once, a film crew arrived at the test range to make a film on nuclear testing, as directed by the Ministries of Defense and General Machine-Building. S. Arkhipov and Colonel N. Ratnikov were supposed to issue film and equipment to the operators, to watch over the filming, and, afterwards, to find all of it. The operators were lying in a ditch, and Arkhipov and Ratnikov were monitoring them from above. An explosion resounded in the air, and a "mushroom" curled upwards. A terrible heat was raised, and there was a sensation of the eyes shrivelling up. Afterwards, the shock wave hit with such a force that it knocked you over. But Arkhipov and the colonel were standing there in short-sleeved shirts and cotton trousers—this was their only protection.

What were they fighting for? For an idea. In order to protect themselves with a nuclear shield from the damned capitalists. There were no privileges at the test range. However, a free chit, for example, was issued for a meal for 90 kopeks. Civilians who were officially assigned were paid 10 rubles a day, and the military, 2.5 rubles; they were service people, they were not supposed to get fat. Nobody complained. It seemed that things should be the way they were. "We lived together with the scientists," Semen Pavlovich recalls. "We lived amicably, no one commanded anyone, no one was suspicious of anyone. We always helped each other. Designer Sasha Fedorov was the first to come down with radiation sickness. We all did everything we could to get him on his feet for the next test..."

How could it not be understood? It would be a time for a person, as the saying goes, to think about his soul, but he dreams of living until the next test. That is the way it was. At that time, two institutes from the secret cities of Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70 were competing on the test range. They were exploding in turns, and they made comparisons: Who is stronger, who is more efficient? It is nonsense, but they prepared for each as if it were a holiday. When the bomb was moved toward the aircraft, maintenance personnel tried to reach out and touch it—as if it were an historical event! On test days, one captain-lieutenant wore his full dress uniform, and he required the same of his subordinates. (By the way, the uniform in which Arkhipov ran from the radioactive cloud had to be burned, and its cost was charged to the major himself.)

They became accustomed to explosions on the test range and lived as they would anywhere else. Families were brought to the facility, they cultivated gardens... They grew delicious watermelons here, and no one thought that they might carry some kind of contagion.

S. Arkhipov now plans to get these people together. The names of the veterans of the special risk subunits were acquired. It was difficult to establish an all-Union (and now an all-Russian) committee. V. Bentsiyanov, chairman of the committee, had to go to 350 offices of the leadership of the USSR and Russia, of ministries and

departments, before a decree of the Supreme Soviet of Russia appeared, and, afterwards, a decree of the Russian government. Now there is something on paper, but privileges will have to be dragged out of the authorities. Previously, they never asked the motherland for anything. But this does not mean that we do not owe them anything.

Russian Spokesman: No Yeltsin Directive To Resume Testing

*LD0203195593 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1900 GMT 2 Mar 93*

[Text] The spokesman for the Russian president's press office has denied reports on a secret directive from Boris Yeltsin to prepare to resume nuclear tests. In a telephone interview to REUTER, Anatoliy Krasikov said that the press office receives documents from the president immediately after they have been signed, but there has been no directive on nuclear tests. Krasikov was commenting on an article in the German magazine STERN on the acquisition of a copy of a confidential Yeltsin decree regarding preparatory work to resume tests on the Arctic island of Novaya Zemlya.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Further on Russian Emigre's BW Charges

*93P50089A St. Petersburg VECHEARNIY PETERBURG
in Russian 25 Jan 93 p 1*

["Foreign Ministry Dossier: They Were Developing Biological Weapons in Leningrad—So the British BBC Informs Us"]

[Text] A subject which directly concerns our city appeared on the British BBC's weekly review, rebroadcast yesterday on a St. Petersburg television program. It was about biological weapons [BW]. The anchorwoman reported that BBC had "seen a letter sent to Boris Yeltsin by the United States and Great Britain, in which it is said that dangerous research might be continued behind the Russian president's back."

The British TV program's anchorwoman noted that the work was allegedly carried out in three military facilities and four civilian ones in Obolensk, Koltsov, Chekhov and Leningrad.

On 8 June 1990, the BBC noted, Margaret Thatcher walked the streets of Moscow during her visit with Mikhail Gorbachev. Not far from the Kremlin she received information that Russia was violating the 1972 pact banning BW. At that time it was officially declared that relations between the two states were continuing to improve step by step. But Thatcher confidentially asked Gorbachev, as she asked the Americans several days later: Are new types of weapons of mass destruction being developed? Gorbachev answered that the Soviet

Union had no programs to develop biological or toxic weapons. He repeated earlier promises to look into the question.

In 1989 the Leningrad biologist Vladimir Pasechnik went to British intelligence and reported about genetic engineering developments for military purposes. He was the director of the program. In 1989 he worked in the Leningrad branch of the Biopreparat organization, which belonged to the Ministry of Health. In fact, Pasechnik told an anchorman, its 400 employees were working, not on vaccines, but on biological weapons.

"In Leningrad it was very difficult for me to do anything legally. And I came to the conclusion that one way to stop the program was to pass information about it to the West," Pasechnik said on TV.

Boris Yeltsin decided that he should get the facts, British TV continued. And in 1992 he told President Bush that there had been a secret BW development program in the Soviet Union but that he, the president, had stopped further research. He set up a special commission to elucidate the details.

After several months Moscow reported to the UN about its program. It was said that although actual weapons had not been manufactured, there were nonetheless plans to create very dangerous microorganisms.

The research was carried out in Leningrad, the BBC commentator continued. She noted that President Yeltsin would have liked to control the development of events and to put the bacteriological genie back in its bottle, but that the military-industrial complex had had more influence. Therefore the CIA and MI-6 (the British intelligence service) will carefully investigate whether the new democratic Russia can—unlike the former Soviet Union—comply with its international obligations.

TV Crew Visits, Films 'Secret' Virological Center

PM2602144793 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1700 GMT 17 Feb 93

[From the "You'll Never Get This" program: Report over video entitled "The Fifth Circle—Devil's Kitchen" from a secret virological center near Moscow]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Unidentified female correspondent over video of virological establishment perimeter fence, guard dog, gate guarded by soldiers] Task No. 1 [in the event of a biological warfare attack] was to protect the troops. These problems have always constituted a state secret. Information pertaining to this subject is top secret in any country. Try to visit a similar establishment in the United States, Britain, or Israel. You will not even get close to it. That is quite understandable.

Less than a year ago our journalists failed to gain access to one of the most secret virological centers in Moscow

Oblast. Only now, and only after a lot of effort, were we allowed to visit, and not just to visit but also to shoot. Exclusively for our program. We were shown everything except the laboratories where people are working with pathogenic organisms which cause infectious diseases. This is a safety measure, we were told; there are no vaccines.

The institute's estate is a territory within a territory. The reason is the same as the one just given, I believe. The institute's very title—"Virological Center"—breathes secrecy and danger.

So what secrets are kept behind these fences? We wanted to look into every nook and corner. We constantly had the impression they were trying to hide something from us. The buildings are old, and the equipment is not exactly new either. But, like everywhere else in our country, people are working and are even managing to make discoveries. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent over video of man in protective clothing] This man must know more than the others. He is wearing a protective suit, working in a closed laboratory, and taking a decontamination shower. [Video shows man emerging from shower.]

[Correspondent addressing him] Have you ever handled biological weapons?

[Unidentified man] Personally, no.

[Correspondent] And the institute as such?

[Unidentified man] I do not know.

[Correspondent over video of laboratory scenes] So who does know? After all, there is no smoke without a fire.

Take waste disposal, for example. It is rigorously monitored. Used water is subjected to purification processes, involving various substances and high temperatures before the water is discharged into the sewage system. Everything else is disinfected and subjected to high temperatures in autoclaves or incinerated. What you see coming out of the chimney is not smoke but steam at a temperature of 150 degrees.

But the thought persists: Where is that for which we are looking?

[Correspondent addressing uniformed official] I am aware that you have not thrown the door wide open to us, but have allowed us to see only through a crack. Nonetheless, where is the truth?

[A.A. Makhlay, director of the virological center] We had information that, back in the thirties, an extensive program for the development and even the production of biological weapons had been adopted in Japan. In 1941 the United States drew up such a program. Later Britain also followed suit. They too had such a program. After the war we knew this; naturally, we had information to this effect, but in view of the situation prevailing after

the war, no one was in a position to do anything about this. We simply could not, for understandable reasons. We did not respond until the early fifties.

[Correspondent] What, specifically, were you working on?

[Makhlay] We worked on the development of experimental samples, we were testing experimental samples.

[Correspondent] Experimental samples of what?

[Makhlay] Of cocktails, of biological cocktails [retseptura].

[Correspondent] What cocktails?

[Makhlay] We worked on... you want to know with which specific pathogens we were working?

[Correspondent] Yes, yes, yes.

[Makhlay] We were working with exanthematous fever [sypnoy tif] agents, we were working with agents of Venezuelan encephalomyelitis of horses, and some other arboviruses.

[Correspondent over video of dilapidated building, sign in Russian reading To the Shelter] This is where biological weapons were worked on. In this very building. This is where the former top secret laboratories were located. Entry was strictly restricted. This is what remains. A crew from the Ministry of Defense came and reduced everything to smithereens in true Russian style, including expensive, sophisticated instruments, equipment, and refrigeration chambers.

Meanwhile the rich Americans have destroyed nothing, pleading lack of money. Their laboratories have been mothballed. But prophylactic work is periodically carried out. Everything is kept in working order.

[N.T. Vasilyev, head of the Russian Defense Ministry Biological Defense Directorate] We only had experimental samples of cocktails which were tested in laboratory and field conditions. Individual lines were set up,

which could have been used in wartime for the production of these specific cocktails. However, no biological weapons were produced or stockpiled in our country. We had no biological weapons. Individual studies were carried out in this sphere, and if there had been a government decision, a special decision, then prior to 1985 this task could have been carried out, given additional effort.

ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

Russian Officers: Troop Cuts Planned in Far East
OW2502105193 Tokyo KYODO in English 1026 GMT 25 Feb 93

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 25 KYODO—Russia has cut the number of troops stationed in its Far Eastern region by about 120,000 to roughly half what it was 5 years ago, a Russian military expert said Thursday. Maj. Gen. Genadiy Dmitriyevich Ivanov, a professor at Russia's General Staff Academy, gave the figure on the closing day of a 2-day joint Japan-Russian military seminar in Tokyo.

Japan's most recent White Paper on Defense puts Russia's Far Eastern military strength at 320,000, but the Japanese Defense Agency says the estimate may be oversimplified because it is difficult to define the extent of the region and which troop units it includes.

Lt. Gen. Andrey Ivanovich Nikolayev, another Russian participant in the seminar, said the 5-million-strong military force maintained by the former Soviet Union will be reduced to 1.5 million by 2000. Nikolayev said 30-35 percent of the final total would be Army, while the main defense responsibilities would be handled by the Navy and Air Forces. Nikolayev, who is the first deputy chief of staff of the Armed Forces, said he could not disclose how many of these forces would be stationed in the Far East.

The seminar is the first personnel exchange between defense authorities from the two countries.

FRANCE

Hades Nuclear Missile Program Continued in Secret

PM1602111493 Paris LE MONDE in French
11 Feb 93 p 10

[Jacques Isnard report: "France Has Maintained Operational 'Watch' Over Hades Nuclear Missile"]

[Text] Despite the sudden decision by France in May 1992 to end production of its Hades nuclear missile intended for the Army, the program in fact continued—in the greatest secrecy—until the end of the year to ensure that the weapon system could be activated if necessary. This information is given in the conditional form in the latest issue of the specialized weekly AIR AND COSMOS-AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL. It is confirmed in administrative and industrial circles in the armaments sector.

To replace the Pluton missile which has gradually been withdrawn from service, the Aerospatiale group was given the job of designing a new weapon system, the Hades, which carries a nuclear warhead with a power which varies according to the effects being sought in the field. The Hades missile, launched from a vehicle which can be elevated and with two missiles per firing platform, has a range of 480 km. Originally, the program involved 40 launchers and 120 missiles at a cost of 17.5 billion francs [Fr]. It was revised downwards in a second stage, with 20 launchers and 40 missiles. Then, in September 1991, it was announced that the weapon system in question would not be deployed in artillery units capable of firing it.

A Cost of Fr10.8 Billion

On 27 May, a defense council meeting chaired by Francois Mitterrand decided to halt the program overnight with an initiative, the suddenness of which came as a great surprise. Indeed, the abandonment of the Hades program was to be "immediate and definitive," according to the terms of the orders officially given by

the authorities to the industrialists concerned, who are mainly Aerospatiale (which has overall responsibility for the system) and Thomson-CSF (for communications specific to this weapon).

At the time the industrialists, who deduced that they would not be paid because of the sudden suspension of their contract, halted everything, including the series of missiles which they still had to complete, the production of the support necessary for the operational implementation of the system (spare parts, logistics, and replacements) and even some of the tests they were due to carry out, especially the so-called "delivery" or "end of procedure" tests for the simultaneous firing of two Hades missiles from the same vehicle which is capable of being elevated. As the magazine AIR AND COSMOS-AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL writes, this decision for a total halt by the defense council only produced a negligible saving "because compensation would have to be paid for the canceled orders."

Since then, administrative and industrial armaments circles have learned that, on the basis of 20 launchers and 30 missiles which will not be deployed, the manufacturers have continued work following a countermanding order. The cost of the program was estimated at Fr10.8 billion at the end of last year. "The work," the specialist magazine adds, "has made it possible to complete the manufacture of 90 percent of the missiles stipulated in the program. All these missiles have been placed in a protective shell. This means that they cannot be put into service or deployed quickly. On the other hand they can be activated one day if necessary."

According to details obtained from the defense ministry, measures have been taken to stockpile the missiles and to ensure technical and operational monitoring so that the system can be put into service in 2 years if necessary. Another advantage of this solution is that the Hades, maintained in such conditions, can be regarded as a weapon which can be included in the tally of existing nuclear arsenals when France joins the discussions on comprehensive disarmament which are currently limited to the United States and Russia.

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